Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University

Schulich Law Scholars
LLM Theses

Theses and Dissertations

2017

The Global Fight against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting under
the OECD’s Country-by-Country Reporting Rules: A Possible
Solution?
Oladiwura Ayeyemi Eyitayo-Oyesode

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/llm_theses
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

The Global Fight against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting under the OECD’s Country-byCountry Reporting Rules: A Possible Solution?

By

Oladiwura Ayeyemi Eyitayo

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Laws

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2017

© Copyright by Oladiwura Ayeyemi Eyitayo, 2017

Dedication
I dedicate this thesis to God Almighty, the Source from whom all blessings flow.

ii

Table of Contents
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………..………………v
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….……………. vi
List of Abbreviations Used……………………………………………….....................................vii
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………...………...……viii
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.0 The Dominance of Multinational Corporations in World Trade and
the Attendant Consequences of BEPS…………………………………………………............1
1.1 Purpose and Rationale of Thesis……………………………………………………..…...........5
1.2 Objective of Thesis…………………………………………………………………...............10
1.3 Literature Review on the Efficacy of the Arm’s Length Principle………................................18
1.4 Literature Review on Country-by-Country Reporting……………………………………......23
1.5 Research Questions…………………………………………………………..........................25
1.6 Structure of the Thesis……………………………………………………………………..…26
Chapter 2: Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): Nature of the Problem
2.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..…28
2.1 What is BEPS?..........................................................................................................................29
2.2 Tax Havens as a Cause of BEPS…………………………………………………………...…34
2.2.1 What are Tax Havens?...........................................................................................................34
2.2.2 How Tax Havens Engender BEPS……………………………………………….………....36
2.3 Transfer Pricing as a Cause of BEPS……………………………………………….…...……38
2.3.1 How Transfer Pricing Engenders BEPS………………………………………….………...41
2.4 Effect of BEPS on National and Global Economy…………………………………..…….….45
2.5 Effect of BEPS on Fiscal Sovereignty………………………………………………….…….51
2.6 Effect of BEPS on the Notion of “Tax Justice” ……………………………………….……...55
2.6.1 The Injustice/Unfairness BEPS Creates for States……………………………….………....56
2.6.2 The Injustice/Unfairness BEPS Creates for Taxpayers other than MNCs………………......58
2.7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………....61

Chapter 3: The OECD and the UN’s Anti-BEPS Initiatives: An Assessment
3.0 Introduction……………………………………………………………………..……………63
3.1 The OECD and Harmful Tax Competition……………………………………………….…..66
iii

3.2 The OECD’s 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition: An Assessment…………………...68
3.3 Tracing the Evolution of the Arm’s Length Principle…………………………………….…..72
3.4 Developing the Arm’s Length Principle: The OECD Double
Tax Convention……………………………………………………………………………....76
3.4.1 The Development of the OECD’s Double Tax Convention…………………………..….…76
3.4.2 Overview of the Arm’s Length Principle under the OECD’s Double
Tax Convention on Income & Capital, 2014………………………………………….…...77
3.5 The Arm’s Length Principle in the UN Model Double Tax Convention between
Developed and Developing Countries……...………………………………………………...81
3.6 The Arm’s Length Principle under the UN and OECD Regimes……………….………....….82
3.6.1 The Nature of the Arm’s Length Principle…………………………………………….…....82
3.6.2 The Arm’s Length Principle and Transfer Pricing Methods……………………….…...…..84
3.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….…...91
Chapter 4: The OECD and the Country-by-Country Reporting Mechanism: An Assessment
4.0 Introduction………………………………………………………………………….…….…93
4.1 The OECD’s BEPS Project…………………………………………………………..…….…94
4.2 Evolution of the Country-by-Country Reporting……………………………………..…...….98
4.3 The OECD CBCR Mechanism: Introduction…………………………………………….…101
4. 4 Viability of the OECD’ CBCR in the Global Fight against BEPS:
A Weak Regime....................................................................................................................106
4.4.1 The Threshold Clause……………………………………………………………….....….107
4.4.2 The Confidentiality Clause……………………………………………………...……..….109
4.4.3 Appropriate use……………………………………………………………………....…...117
4.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...……..…….119
Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.0 The Formulary Apportionment Approach: A Better Complement
to the OECD’s Country-By-Country Reporting Rules?…………………….……………....121
5.1 The Formulary Apportionment Approach: Background and Nature………….…..………....123
5.2 The Workings of the FA Approach………………………………………………...……......127
5.3 The Value of CBCR Under the Formulary Apportionment Approach...............…..…….…132
5.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...…..…….....134
Bibliography…………………………………………..………………………………...….......137

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1: Revenue from the Companies Income Tax, in Percent of Total Revenue………...…….46
Figure 2: The Global Cost of Tax Avoidance…………………………………………….……....49
Figure 3: Countries that Lose the Most Revenue as a Result of Tax Avoidance…………...……...50
Figure 4: OECD Revenue Statistics………………………………………………………………60

v

Abstract
The base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) phenomenon continues to create detrimental
consequences in states. BEPS is engendered by two fundamental factors, namely, unhealthy fiscal
policies of tax havens and preferential tax regimes, and transfer mispricing by multinational
corporations (MNCs). The OECD, through its BEPS Project notes that the lack of transparency in
the global activities of MNCs is a major cause of BEPS. To close this gap, the OECD released the
CBCR Rules. This thesis discusses the severity of the BEPS phenomenon and assesses the antiBEPS efforts of the OECD. Upon an assessment of these efforts, this thesis argues for a switch
from the application of transfer pricing methods to the formulary apportionment approach. It also
argues that this formulary apportionment approach is a better complement to the OECD’s CBCR
Rules as a tool by which BEPS can be eliminated globally.

vi

List of Abbreviations Used

ALP

Arm’s Length Principle

BALRM

Basic Arm’s Length Return Method

BEPS

Base erosion and profit shifting

CBCR

Country-by-Country Reporting

CCCTB

Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base

CFCs

Controlled Foreign Corporations

CPM

Comparable Profit Method

CRA

Canada Revenue Agency

CUP

Comparable Uncontrolled Price

DBCT

Destination-based-cash flow tax

EITI

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

EU

European Union

FA

Formulary Apportionment

FDI

Foreign Direct Investment

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

IMF

International Monetary Fund

MCAA

Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement

MNCs

Multinational corporations

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OEEC

Organization for European Economic Co-operation

QCAA

Qualifying Competent Authority Agreement

UK

United Kingdom

UNCTAD

United Nations Commission on Trade and Development

US

United States

vii

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank everyone who contributed in one way or the other to the success of my thesis
and my LLM program in general.
I would like to thank the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University and the George Caines
Scholarship in Law for their financial support.
My sincere gratitude also goes to my supervisor, Professor Kim Brooks. Her consistent motivation
and guidance contributed a great deal to the success of my LLM program. I would also like to
thank Professor Geoffrey Loomer and Professor Michael Deturbide for taking time out of their
busy schedules to review my thesis.
I would like to thank Professor Richard Devlin for his tutoring. His teachings on legal scholarship
gave me insights into what is expected of me as a legal scholar. The seminars on legal scholarship
helped me to discover the methodologies that I used in writing this thesis. I would also like to
thank Mr David Dzidzornu for his invaluable support towards the successful completion of my
program. Thank you for reviewing my drafts, encouraging me and pushing me to do more.
I would like to thank my classmates, some of whom have become close friends, Wendy, MarieEve, Anne-Marie, Akin, Niran. You all have been a huge support for me this past one year.
I would like to thank my parents and siblings. I am sincerely grateful for your support and prayers.
I would also like to thank my fiancé. You are God’s special gift to me, thank you for always
supporting me.
Lastly and unreservedly, I am eternally grateful to God Almighty for the great doors he has opened
for me to walk in. The grace and strength he has given me to accomplish yet another great feat;
one of many more to come.

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.0 The Dominance of Multinational Corporations in World Trade and the Attendant
Consequences of BEPS
Multinational corporations (MNCs) rose to the centre of world trade because of globalization,
which is simply the “growing interdependence of countries”.1 Globalization transformed trade
activities by corporations from activities within national borders to transnational transactions.2 It
made possible free-flow of trade across borders, encouraged foreign direct investment abroad, and
is responsible for the mobile world that we live in where transactions occur just by the click of a
button.3 MNCs continue to maintain their relevance to world economy, as they contribute
significantly to the revenue of most countries. Statistics reveal the increasing dominance of MNCs
and their significance to world economy. For example, it has been estimated that approximately
one-third of international trade occurs with intra-firm transfers by MNCs.4 In 2015, the top one
hundred MNCs identified by UNCTAD were shown to have more than 500 affiliates each, across
more than 50 countries.5 Also, according to UNCTAD, foreign direct investment by MNCs jumped
by thirty-eight percent to $1.76 trillion in 2015.6
Although MNCs maintain a significant position in world trade, aggressive tax planning activities
by them pose a threat to national and global economies.7 Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS)

1

Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen, “Redistribution, Globalization, and Multi-Level Governance” (2014) 1:1 MOPP 6181 at 62
2
Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (New York: Viking Free Press, 2004); see
also Jensen, Nathan M. Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct
Investment. (Princeton University Press, 2006)
3
Ibid.
4
Jensen, Nathan M. Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct
Investment. (Princeton University Press, 2006)
5
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016: (Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges). United Nations, Geneva.
6
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: (Reforming International Investment Governance). United Nations,
Geneva.
7
Yariv Brauner, “What the BEPS”, (2014) 16 Fla. Tax Rev. 55 at 64.

1

refers to tax avoidance strategies which exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially
shift profits from source countries (countries where real economic activities which generated the
profits of MNCs occurred) to low or no-tax locations.8 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 2013, estimated that about $100-$240 billion representing
4%-10% of global corporate income tax is lost to BEPS annually.9 The OECD is at the forefront
of the global fight against BEPS. Its approach is through the concerted efforts of states, aimed at
implementing rules which would operate as anti-BEPS measures.10 The OECD demonstrated this
approach through its BEPS Action Plans that are centred around multilateral implementation of
proposed rules.11
Apart from the revenue loss that BEPS creates in countries, BEPS equally threatens the
fundamental notion of “fiscal sovereignty” which characterizes statehood. Taxation lies at the
core of sovereignty of states,12 but BEPS-related activities of MNCs affect the exercise of fiscal
rights of states. These BEPS-related activities of MNCs are being encouraged by the grant of low
or no tax rates to MNCs by tax havens. This lax tax regime in tax havens encourages MNCs to
shift profits from source countries to tax havens. Consequently, source countries may be prevented
from taxing multinational corporation profits, because MNCs make investment policies based on
the differences in these national fiscal policies. They leverage the gaps in the investment

8

OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last accessed 21 April 2017).
OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11- 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, (2015) at 102.
10
OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing at 10-11, see also the OECD: G20
Summit, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation, online: www.oecd.org/g20/summits/saintpetersburg/ (last accessed
21 April 2017).
11
Ibid.
12
Allisson Christians, “Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract”, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99 (2009).
9
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framework of the different jurisdictions in which they operate to reduce the amount of taxes the
pay on their global profits.13
In addition, BEPS creates an atmosphere of inequity for private individuals and domestic firms,
given that this category of taxpayers lack the opportunities open to MNCs for tax avoidance.
Consequently, these categories of taxpayers are left to bear the consequences of the reduction in
domestic revenue, through increases in taxes for private individuals and domestic firms.14
The history of the OECD’s work against BEPS formally began in 1998, when it released a report
entitled “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue”.15 In this Report, the OECD
proscribes the use of low tax rates by countries to attract portfolio capital from MNCs without real
ties with economic activities producing this capital. In the words of the OECD, the use of low tax
rates by tax havens to attract MNC profits results into a “race to the bottom”16. It makes countries
adopt unhealthy fiscal measures which “may hamper the application of progressive tax rates and
the achievement of redistributive goals”17. The OECD admits that this situation results in “harmful
tax competition” which “diminishes global welfare and undermines taxpayer confidence in the
integrity of tax systems.”18 The OECD’s approach for tackling harmful tax practices changed in
2013 through its BEPS Project from solely targeting unhealthy fiscal measures by tax havens, to

13

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for
Reconciliation”, (2010) 2: 1 World Tax J. 2, at 3-18. Avi-Yonah discusses the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ annual
surveys of operations of U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates in 2005, which shows that the
difference in tax rates world over influence the financial decisions of US MNCs.
14
See Lee Corrick, “The Taxation of Multinational Enterprises in Thomas Pogge & Krishen Metha ed, Global Tax
Fairness (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016) 173-4.
15
OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, 1998.
www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf (last accessed 25 April 2017)
16
Ibid at 14.
17
Ibid, see also see also Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, “Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD's
Campaign against 'Harmful Tax Competition',” (2013) 4:1 Columbia Journal of Tax Law 3.
18
Ibid at p. 8.
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generally addressing the inadequacies in rules governing taxation of MNCs which encourage the
BEPS related activities by MNCs.
The BEPS Project is the OECD’s most recent initiative which targets the inadequacies in rules
governing taxation of MNCs.19 Through the BEPS Project, the OECD recognizes that the current
international taxation rules which govern how multinational corporations are taxed encourage
BEPS related activities by (MNCs), and as such there ought to be amendments to the rules through
the concerted efforts of states.20
The OECD, in 2013, released fifteen action plans reflecting issues perceived as gaps in current
international tax rules which create opportunities for BEPS. The OECD’s BEPS Action plans are
aimed at promoting transparency and ensuring value creation, that is, ensuring that the profits of
MNCs are taxed in jurisdictions where the economic activities generating those profits occurred.
The OECD’s fifteen BEPS action plans can be summarized under six broad headings: (1) tackling
the challenges in digital economy that undermine value creation; (2) addressing hybrids and
mismatch arrangements in transactions that counteract value creation; (3) dealing with provisions
in double taxation treaties that encourage BEPS; (4) solving the challenge of lack of information
about the global activities of MNCs; (5) creating effective mechanisms for dispute resolution; and
(6) developing a multilateral instrument for the effective implementation of the outcomes of the
BEPS project.

19
20

Supra note 10.
Ibid at 10-11.
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1.1 Purpose and Rationale
In this thesis, I take on the challenge of assessing the viability of the Country-by-Country
Reporting (CBCR) Rules, which is the thirteenth proposed action plan by the OECD. This
necessarily leads to an analysis of international transfer pricing rules, which are addressed in BEPS
Action Plans 8-10. According to the OECD, the CBCR Rules, when implemented by states, would
help solve the problem of lack of information about the global activities of MNCs. The problem
of lack of information about the global activities of MNCs, which includes circumstances
surrounding the transfer prices fixed on both internal and external transactions, contributes
significantly to the ineffective application of the arm’s length principle for taxing multinational
corporation profits.21 The arm’s length principle involves a comparison of the prices fixed by
MNCs on related-entity transactions with prices that would have been fixed if the transactions
were between unrelated entities. Transfer pricing guidelines exist in most states, requiring MNCs
that carry on business activities within their jurisdictions to file documentation with tax authorities,
showing how the transfer prices fixed on their transactions conform to the arm’s length
principle/standard. This documentation, however, has been said to provide only limited
information about the global businesses of MNCs, thus, they have proved ineffective in preventing
transfer mispricing, which ultimately results into BEPS.
The OECD therefore proposes adjustments to the transfer pricing documentation through the
requirement that MNCs with consolidated revenue of not less than €750 million or near equivalent
in domestic currency file CBCR with states where they conduct business activities. These reports
are to contain information about the structures of MNC groups, their nature of businesses and

21

Ibid.
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details about the economic activities carried on by each member of the MNC group. The CBCR
Rules require MNCs to file information on the global businesses of MNCs with relevant tax
authorities, including the total profits made by MNCs across jurisdictions and the amount of taxes
paid in those jurisdictions. According to the OECD, the information contained in CBCR would
assist states to combat BEPS globally.
However, in this thesis, I maintain a different position as to the efficacy of the CBCR Rules in
advancing the global fight against BEPS. My position is based on my assessment of key provisions
of the CBCR Rules in the context of the problem of BEPS which the rules were designed to solve.
I evaluate the effectiveness of the CBCR Rules in the context of the OECD’s objective to end
BEPS globally. The contribution of this thesis is to evaluate the key provisions of the CBCR Rules
(internal assessment) and the broader principles upon which they are based, that is, the arm’s length
principle in the context of the OECD’s declared objective to end BEPS globally (external
assessment). In turn, the goal of this assessment is to reveal the gaps in the OECD’s CBCR Rules
as one of the action plans as a tool to end BEPS.
Between 2013 when the OECD in its BEPS Action Plans highlighted the importance of detailed
transfer pricing documentation22 until July 2017 when the OECD reviewed its transfer pricing
guidelines with specific rules on CBCR, the OECD has released six sets of guidance and

22

See Action Plans 8-13 supra note 10.
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implementation packages containing the content of the CBCR Rules and the mechanism for
enforcement23. Richard Murphy, the inventor of CBCR24, declares:
All that country-by-country reporting demands is that multinational corporations publish a
profit and loss account and limited balance sheet and cash flow information for every
jurisdiction in which they trade as part of their annual financial statements25.
The OECD’s CBCR requires MNCs to report:
…annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business the amount of revenue,
profit before income tax and income tax paid and accrued. It also requires MNEs to report
their total employment, capital, retained earnings and tangible assets in each tax
jurisdiction. Finally, it requires MNEs to identify each entity within the group doing
business in a particular tax jurisdiction and to provide an indication of the business
activities each entity engages in.26
Lack of information about the operations of MNCs has been identified as a major hindrance to
the effective application of transfer pricing rules based on the arm’s length principle by tax
authorities.27 Although tax authorities, by the provisions of their transfer pricing rules, require
MNCs to file some documentation on their transfer pricing policies, the information provided by
these MNCs is limited to transactions under assessment by tax authorities. Notwithstanding the

23

OECD, Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, OECD/G20 Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014;
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Action 13, Guidance on the Implementation of Transfer Pricing
Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, February 2015;
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 13: Country-by-Country Reporting Implementation
Package, 2015;
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Guidance on the Implementation of the Country-by-Country
Reporting: BEPS Action 13, 12 October 2016;
OECD, Signatories to the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country
Reports (CBC MCAA), online: www.oecd.org; and
OECD (2017), Guidance on the Implementation of Country-by-Country Reporting – BEPS Action 13, OECD,
Paris.
24
Richard Murphy: Time for Country-by-Country Reporting: www.//economia.icaew.com/opinion/march2014/richard-murphy-country-by-country (last accessed 19 July 2017)
25
Richard Murphy, Country-by-Country Reporting in Thomas in Thomas Pogge & Krishen Metha ed, Global Tax
Fairness (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016) 96.
26
OECD, Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, OECD/G20 Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 2014.
27
See United Nations, Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, Department of Social Affairs,
United Nations, New York, 2013 for the reports of emerging economies as to the challenges they face in applying
effectively the arm’s length principle.
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existence of transfer pricing rules, tax administrations still complain of lack of adequate
documentation necessary for the assessment of MNC transactions.28 The implication of the current
situation under the various transfer pricing rules is that there is limited information about the global
businesses of MNCs, and this prevents tax authorities from doing a good job of ascertaining the
appropriateness of the transfer prices fixed by MNCs. Thus, the OECD desires to solve this
problem of lack of information through the CBCR Rules.
This thesis evaluates the key provisions of the CBCR Rules in the context of the OECD’s declared
objective to end BEPS globally for four major reasons. BEPS continues to threaten the revenue of
source states; impede the exercise of fiscal rights by states; create an atmosphere of tax injustice
for other taxpayers; and threaten the legitimacy of corporate income taxation as a source of revenue
in general. Therefore, I discuss the gaps in the CBCR Rules, which if not amended, further promote
BEPS rather than combat it. I identify these gaps and propose amendments to them. The purpose
is to dispense with the arm’s length principle, and to adopt the formulary apportionment (FA)
approach to govern taxation of MNC profits. The switch to the FA approach as proposed by this
thesis is towards the fulfilment of the OECD’s goal to end BEPS globally, from the standpoint of
the CBCR Rules.
The CBCR rules as they are lack general application because they apply to MNCs with
consolidated revenue of not less than € 750 million threshold. I query this prescribed threshold
because there is no evidence that only MNCs above this threshold engage in BEPS related
activities. In a similar way, the rules preclude non-signatories to the OECD’s multilateral

28

OECD, Public Consultation Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation And
Cbc Reporting, 30 January 2014: www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-transfer-pricingdocumentation.pdf (last accessed 21 July 2017).
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instrument for exchange of CBCR29 from accessing the CBCR Reports even if they have within
their jurisdictions entities of those MNCs which filed the CBCR Reports. This threshold leaves
out eighty-five to ninety per cent of MNCs,30 combined with the exclusion of non-signatories from
the exchange of CBCR, these two clauses by all sense of objectivity go against the OECD’s
intention to fight against BEPS globally.
The second argument that I make in this thesis is that the arm’s length principle, the current
standard that applies to the taxation of multinational corporation profits, would impede any level
of success that the CBCR Rules may bring. This argument is that in light of the various problems
that characterize the application of the principle, the CBCR rules rather than operating as a tool to
end BEPS may further promote it. I, therefore, weigh these problems and consider the solutions
that the CBCR Rules seek to provide to see if the rules can sufficiently deal with the issue of BEPS
globally if the arm’s length principle is retained as the OECD proposes. My assessment, however,
reveals that the problem of BEPS would remain with us for as long as the arm’s length principle
is being used to divide multinational corporation profits. This is because related entities generally
exploit organizational and internalization advantages, which are embedded in business
transactions with related entities.31 As such, the assumption that characterizes the arm’s length
principle, which is that it is possible for the transfer prices fixed by MNCs to be at arm’s length,
is not attuned to the realities of business transactions between related entities. The huge amount
that is being lost to BEPS annually as declared by the OECD, the threat which the BEPS related
activities of MNCs continue to pose both to the fiscal rights of states, and the cardinal principle of

29

Ibid at 29.
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Action 13, Guidance on the Implementation of Transfer
Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, February 2015.
31
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly Clausing, & Michael C. Durst, “Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A
Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split” (2009) 9:5 Florida Tax review 497.
30
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fairness, account for my argument for the avoidance of the transfer pricing rules in total. I therefore
make a proposal for an alternative means for taxing multinational corporation profits, that is, the
formulary apportionment approach.
1.2 Objective of Thesis
In light of the problem of lack of information, which the OECD intends to solve through the CBCR
Rules, this thesis examines three important provisions of the CBCR Rules that define the viability
of the OECD’s global fight against BEPS through the Rules. These clauses are the threshold clause;
the confidentiality clause; and the rule on “appropriate use” of CBCR Reports. The threshold rule
requires MNCs with consolidated revenue of not less than € 750 million to file CBCR reports. The
confidentiality clause proscribes publication of CBCR, and the “appropriate use” clause disallows
tax authorities from utilizing information derived from the CBCR reports in assessing the tax
liabilities of MNCs. The confidentiality clause prevents signatories to the OECD’s CBCR Rules
from sharing the CBCR reports with non-signatories even if these non-signatories have within
their jurisdictions entities of MNCs that filed the CBCR Reports.
The analysis of these key provisions of the CBCR Rules reveals that the rules at present are not
positioned in a way to make it possible to solve the problem of BEPS globally through them. First,
there is no evidence that only MNCs above the prescribed threshold engage in BEPS related
activities. Second, the prohibition of the exchange of CBCR Reports with non-signatories to the
OECD’s Multilateral Information Exchange Instrument of the CBCR Rules32 removes some
countries from the OECD’s laudable initiative to end BEPS globally through the CBCR Rules.

32

OECD, Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country
Reports (Cbc Mcaa) And Signing Dates Status as of 22 June 2017: www.oecd.org/tax/beps/CbC-MCAASignatories.pdf (last accessed 21 July 2017).
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Third, non-publication of CBCR may hamper the OECD’s desire to eliminate BEPS globally. The
proscription of the publication of CBCR Reports is unhelpful in the objective assessment of the
activities of MNCs in a way that promotes transactions that are in alignment with value creation,
that is, transactions that allow source countries to tax profits derived from activities carried out by
MNC entities within their jurisdictions. With a proposed standard of “accountability” being
introduced into the global activities of MNCs, I argue for publication of CBCR. This may in turn
assist tax authorities in effectively taxing MNCs, since there is public awareness about the BEPS
related-activities of MNCs. Public disclosure of CBCR would go a long way in attracting
comments on the appropriateness or otherwise of transactions between MNC entities from
individual taxpayers and may prove relevant in checking incidences of unfair assessments by tax
authorities.
The third provision of the CBCR Rules that I assess against the OECD’s objective to end BEPS
globally is the “appropriate use” clause. This clause sets out the scope of the CBCR Reports filed.
According to the provisions contained in that clause, tax authorities are allowed to utilize the
CBCR Reports to assess high level transfer pricing risks or other BEPS related risks. Tax
authorities are not allowed to rely on the CBCR Reports to adjust the tax liabilities of MNCs. Also,
tax authorities are permitted to share the CBCR Reports only with parties to the OECD’s
mechanism for exchange of CBCR Reports. Only 46 countries are parties to this mechanism. In
my assessment, these limitations on the use of the CBCR Reports defeat the OECD’s objective to
end BEPS globally. Based on these arguments, this thesis displaces the claim by the OECD that
the current CBCR Rules are well-positioned to deter BEPS globally, and proposes amendments to
these provisions in alignment with the OECD’s stated objective. Altogether, the CBCR Rules have
lofty ideals; they seek to promote transparency about the global activities of MNCs and to check

11

incidences of BEPS. These key clauses in the CBCR Rules, if not amended, would further
aggravate the problem of BEPS.
The second main argument in this thesis is the impossibility of a global fight against BEPS with
the retention of the arm’s length principle as is done in the OECD’s BEPS project. Currently, the
arm’s length principle faces a barrage of economic and practical challenges that make it unsuitable
for taxation of business activities of MNCs. The principle opens opportunities for MNCs to engage
in abusive transfer pricing, which leads to BEPS. The arm’s length principle entails a consideration
by tax authorities of the question that: “What would independent enterprises do?” 33. In search of
an answer to this question, tax authorities search for comparables, either internal or external.
Internal comparables entail a search for the prices that would have been fixed if the transactions
being assessed were between entities of MNCs and unrelated entities. External comparables, on
the other hand, require determining the prices that contracting unrelated entities would have fixed
for the transactions being assessed.34 The arm’s length principle is premised on the determination
of the “reasonable price”. In determining what is the reasonable price of goods and services
between related entities, resort is had to the market value.35 The justification for the use of market
value is explained by Hanlin & Claywell, “[t]he foremost reason to use the Market Approach is
that, when suitable data are available, it provides a verifiable and objective measure of value.
Actual sales, in a public market at arm’s length of similar interests, are compelling evidence”.36
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Stanley S. Surrey justifies “market value” as benchmark for the application of the arm’s length
principle:
The use of this arm’s length standard is a natural reaction. Tax administrators do not
question transactions that are governed by the marketplace. If Company A sells goods to
unrelated Company B at a certain price or furnishes services at a particular price, the
income of both companies is determined by using that price. One company may be large
and the other small; one may be a monopoly; one may be financially strong and the other
in a weak condition. But these and other factors which may affect the price at which the
transaction occurs are not the concern of the tax administrator. His tasks is not to correct
the injustices or unfairness of the marketplace nor to turn bad bargains into fair
arrangements [...] Given this acceptance of the marketplace, a tax system – and tax
administrators working within it – when faced with intra-group transactions not governed
by that marketplace but instead by the policies and goals of the overall enterprise, naturally
seeks to replace the intra-group arrangement with the norm of the marketplace.
Presumably, most transactions are governed by the general framework of the marketplace
and hence it is appropriate to seek to put intra-group transactions under the general
framework. Thus, use of the standard of arm’s length, both to test the actual allocation of
income and expenses resulting under controlled intra-group arrangements and to adjust that
allocation if it does not meet such standard, appears in theory to be a proper course. 37
However, as is often the case, the peculiarities of the transactions between MNC entities makes it
difficult for tax authorities to find comparables. Often, MNCs determine the market value of
products and services supplied and to that extent, the answer to the question of what would
independent enterprises do? becomes a herculean task. This eventually results into modifications
of the arm’s length principle by states38, which in most cases, is borne out of assumptions by tax
authorities on what constitutes the “reasonable prices” in given instances. In summary, the
synergistic opportunities open to MNCs in their transactions create difficulties in ensuring that
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these transactions promote value creation, makes the arm’s length principle unsuitable as a tool
capable of being deployed by states to end BEPS globally.
Therefore, against the inadequacies evident in the application of the arm’s length principle, this
thesis proposes an alternative approach: the unitary taxation (formulary apportionment) approach.
The unitary taxation approach looks in detail at the economic activities resulting into the profits of
MNCs for tax purposes. Under this approach, tax authorities justifiably impose corporate income
taxes on “actual” profits of MNCs as against the uncertain profits apportioned via the arm’s length
principle. The adoption of the arm’s length principle, first in 1933 and subsequently in double
taxation treaties, may have been justifiable given the limited impact of globalization on trade
during those periods. However, against the increasing expansion of international trade, which
creates difficulties in ascertaining fair market values, the retention of the principle does not appear
to be plausible, both against the principle of accountability and transparency. 39
The arm’s length principle, as this thesis argues, is not fit for taxing the globalized business
activities of MNCs because it fails to take into consideration the economic realities of modern
transactions within related entities. I argue that this principle should be replaced with the formulary
apportionment approach (the FA approach). The FA approach is not entirely a new concept in
taxation of MNCs. It is similar to the fractional apportionment approach, which was proposed by
the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations in 193340, although with some distinctions in terms
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of the difference in the amount of taxable profits under the two approaches. Under the fractional
apportionment approach, only the fraction of profits of MNCs are allocated to states. Under the
formulary apportionment approach, however, the general profits of an enterprise are apportioned
to jurisdictions based on the value of contributions by individual entities of MNCs operating in
those jurisdictions. To some extent, the formulary apportionment approach is utilized in Canada
and some states in the US41, in the way these states apportion profits to provinces/states based on
the contributions by entities of corporations in these jurisdictions.42 However, the novelty in the
formulary apportionment approach being proposed as an alternative to the arm’s length principle,
as against the approach in some states in the US and Canada that have adopted this approach, is
the expansion of the taxable profits of MNCs to include profits from cross-border transactions.
The profit split method, as one of the transfer pricing methods contained in the OECD’s Transfer
Pricing Guidelines43, is also similar to the FA approach. The profit split method is premised on the
allocation of profits based on “value creation”, that is, economic activities performed by entities
of MNCs using “allocation keys”, such as functions performed, asset used, and risks assumed.44
The profit split method, in a way, is similar to the formulary apportionment approach in the way
it allocates profit to jurisdictions based on the contribution by entities of MNCs, summarized under
the heading “value creation”. The concept of “value creation” redefined the basis upon which
MNCs are taxed especially on intangibles, which are hard to value in terms of ascertaining the
jurisdiction where services creating those intangibles took place. In general, giving prominence to
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the concept of “value creation” ensures that only those jurisdictions that contributed to the profits
of MNCs get to tax the profits of MNCs45. The radical change to the OECD’s Guidelines, however,
through the alternative approach proposed in this thesis, is the elevation of the formulary
apportionment approach as the sole standard for the apportionment of profits from the cross-border
transactions of MNCs both for tangible and intangible goods and services. Regionally, the
European Union via the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) project, is also
proposing unitary taxation (same as the formulary apportionment approach) in the EU.46 The
implication of this is that the CCCTB when implemented in the EU will ensure that multinational
corporations allocate their profits to states in the EU based on economic activities which occur in
signatories to the CCCTB mechanism.47
Formulary apportionment, as this thesis argues, requires MNCs to account for the values declared
as taxable profits across jurisdictions. The concept of accountability is essential to the basis upon
which taxpayers, including MNCs, are taxed. To this end, I argue that MNCs ought to be required
to justify values that they declare as profits and loss in the jurisdictions in which they operate.
This, in turn will promote accountability and eliminate fiscal avoidance eventually. Picciotto
argues broadly for the inclusion of the notion of “accountability” in international regulatory
processes48. This notion of “accountability” features in World Trade Organization Agreements49
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and Mutual Agreements on Investment (MAI),50 as a condition precedent for trade liberalization
and economic growth between states. According to Picciotto51, accountability in investment
agreements is achieved when governments subject their policy making processes to the test of
public opinion. I adopt this line of argument in my thesis, and argue specifically for the inclusion
of the notion of “accountability” in how MNCs are taxed through the adoption of the FA approach
to replace the arm’s length principle.
I further argue that apart from the incidences of BEPS which are occasioned by transfer mispricing
through the strategies utilized by MNCs to avoid taxes, transfer mispricing also alters the
functionality of taxation in terms of equity. In this context, equity refers to the fairness of tax
administration which entails fair treatment of all taxpayers, whether as private individuals,
domestic firms or as MNCs. The inability to combat BEPS activities by MNCs therefore alters the
notion of tax fairness, and this ultimately creates tax injustice against taxpayers other than MNCs.
As Seligman rightly notes, taxes apart from the fact that they serve as a dependable source of
revenue also have social implications:
It is sometimes asserted that the fiscal object of taxation is simply to secure revenue, while
the social object is to effect some desirable change in social relations. This antithesis rests
upon a failure to observe that finance, like economics, is a social science, and that even
from the narrow political point of view of the relation between the government and the
citizen, the government cannot derive any revenue-that is, cannot take any part of the social
income without inevitably affecting social relations. The fact that the government has in
mind solely the fiscal aim of securing revenue does not alter the social consequences of the
particular revenue. 52
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In sum, this thesis explores the consequences of the proposed CBCR Rules and their potential in
the global fight against BEPS, finding that their application will not resolve the thorny issues of
BEPS.
1.3 Literature Review on the Efficacy of the Arm’s Length Principle
Scholars have discussed the issue of BEPS and have argued for and against the arm’s length
principle as a viable approach to combat it. In discussing the weaknesses of the arm’s length
principle, I discuss the arguments of eleven scholars. In general, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Kimberly
Clausing and Michael Durst take an anti-arm’s length principle position in their papers as they
examine the non-suitability of the principle as a means to tax MNC profits. After an assessment of
the transfer pricing regime in the US, they propose that the formulary profit split method replace
the transfer pricing regime in the US. These authors discuss the challenges embedded in the
application of the transfer pricing principles in assessing and taxing the profits of MNCs in the
US. They trace this to the integrated nature of businesses conducted by related entities, and the
difficulties in applying the separate entity approach to them. Further, they propose that the
formulary profit split method be applied in allocating taxing rights over the profits of MNCs to
states, based on the amount of sales which occurred in these states using the destination-basis sales
formula. These authors extend the proposal for the adoption of the formulary profit split method
to other countries. They discuss the advantages of this method to global taxation of MNCs, and
the need for coordination of taxation policies to ensure uniformity in the taxation of MNCs.
Further, they explain why they prefer the destination-basis sales formula to other indicia of
economic activities, such as payroll and assets. They state that payroll and assets may incentivise
profit shifting to low or no tax jurisdictions which would bring about the same problem of BEPS
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inherent in the current transfer pricing regime. According to Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst53,
sales is the only economic activity that is not prone to distortions out of the other two factors
because it is based on external factors; consumers. They argue that payroll and assets will distort
international investment patterns because they can be manipulated by MNCs. Again, this proposal
for the formulary approach using sales alone, leaves out other jurisdictions where these other two
economic activities; payroll and assets are carried on. They also address some issues which
scholars have raised against the adoption of the formulary approach. This include the question of
the arbitrariness or otherwise of the FA approach, and the need for cooperation among states for
the effective implementation of the approach. They all propose the formulary apportionment
approach as a suitable alternative.54
Avi-Yonah in a separate article examines the modifications that have been made to the arm’s
length principle in the US Transfer Pricing Guidelines.55 He maintains that apart from the
Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method, other methods like the cost plus, resale,
comparable profit method and the profit split in the guidelines have features of the formulary
apportionment approach. Thus, he argues that “despite the common practice of contrasting the
ALS and the formulary methods of dealing with the transfer pricing problem, they are actually not
dichotomous. Instead, they form the two extreme ends of a continuum.”56 He proposes a complete
switch to the unitary taxation approach as the only way by which abusive transfer pricing/transfer
pricing manipulation can be solved.
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Kimberly Clausing joins her voice to the campaign for a switch to the unitary taxation approach,
drawing from the US. state experience57. She considers in detail issues that may create practical
difficulties for the effective application of the unitary taxation approach, such as the measurement
of the formula component in MNCs’ books of account, definition of consolidated business to
which the approach applies, impacts of the approach on tax treaties, possibility of BEPS as a
reaction by MNCs to unitary taxation, and impact of the unitary taxation approach on government
revenue. These issues are relevant to my proposal for a switch to the FA approach, and are
discussed in detail in chapter five of this thesis.
Avi-Yonah, in another article, proposes a compromise between the unitary taxation and the arm’s
length principle in the United States, for the fear that the US may fail to adopt the unitary taxation
approach simpliciter58. In his article, he requests that the formulary apportionment approach be
adopted to tax the residual profits of MNCs with the application of the profit split method under
the arm’s length principle. Under the current US transfer pricing rules, such residual profits are
viewed as the result of high-profit intangibles and, as such, are allocated to where the intangibles
were developed. Avi-Yonah proposes an alternative valuation in the form of an allocation formula
based on the jurisdiction where the economic activity which generated such profit occurred, which
in this case would be the destination of sales. This approach, however, restricts the application of
the FA approach. It fails to reconcile all economic activities which result into multination
corporation profits. This approach is an antithesis of the FA approach which I propose.
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Sol Picciotto argues against the retention of the arm’s length principle. He examines the individual
efforts by states to prevent fiscal avoidance, which resulted in double taxation agreements between
states, especially circumstances surrounding the adoption of the arm’s length principle. According
to Picciotto, the arm’s length principle detracts from an understanding of the integrated nature of
business activities between related entities and, as such, is unsuitable for taxing MNC profit. 59
Scott Wilkie’s argument is focused on the nature of the arm’s length principle. He maintains that
the principle is based on assumptions instead of the economic realities that shape MNC activities,
and therefore should be abandoned on this premise.60 The work of Yariv Brauner61 and Richard
Vann62 on the arm’s length principle is essentially directed at the challenges inherent in the
application of the principle in taxing intangibles. They argue that the weaknesses of the principle
are more pronounced in this regard because of the difficulties involved in valuing intangibles.
Wells and Lowell discuss the arm’s length principle as one of the many errors of the OECD. Their
presentation of the principle reveals the intention behind the adoption of the principle which they
say was a tactic to rob source countries which are mainly developing countries of taxable MNC
profits due them.63
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Lorraine Eden argues for the reinvigoration of transfer pricing rules as the solution to the gaping
holes in international tax rules that create BEPS.64 In her assessment of the challenges posed by
the abusive transfer pricing by MNCs that occasion BEPS, she proposes that the current allocation
rules between source and residence countries be tightened. To this end, she proposes that residence
countries tax the worldwide profits of resident MNCs (including unrepatriated profits) with tax
credits for foreign taxes paid. For source countries, she proposes “a regime with stronger antiabuse rules”, such as Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFC) Rules. In her word, “I see an “income
tax design” problem, not a transfer pricing problem. The solution is to re-establish the international
tax regime.”65 I argue against Eden’s proposal in chapter 5 on the ground that her proposal for
worldwide taxation of MNC profits by residence countries will further distort international
taxation rules, and advance BEPS in source countries.
From an economic standpoint, Dhammika Dharmapala’s work66 contributes significantly to the
topic. He assesses the efficiency consequences of the current rules for taxing US MNCs and the
proposed alternatives to them. These consequences include: distortions to the use of external debt,
distortions to the choice of organizational form, distortions to asset ownership and more. He
assesses the following proposed alternatives: territorialism with a reduction in the corporate tax
rates, formulary apportionment, and the destination-based cash flow tax (the DBCT). He opts for
the 'Destination-based cash flow tax' (the DBCT) as a more viable approach. According to him,
the formulary apportionment approach can be manipulated by MNCs; producing other shades of
distortion other than the ones being experienced under the separate entity/arm’s length principle.
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According to him, the DBCT approach, which jettisons the source and residence rules and focuses
on the destination of consumption, is more viable in effectively taxing US MNCs. This approach
is like that which Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst propose67, and my critique of their proposal
applies here as well.
Wolfgang Schön proposes a radical change to the current international tax rules for states in the
European Union.68 According to him, the appropriate response to the inefficiency of the arm’s
length principle is the modification of the international tax rules to expand the taxing rights of
source countries. This is to ensure that additional profits derived by local entities or permanent
establishments of foreign-based MNCs are not left untaxed. This line of argument supports my
proposal, because the implication of my proposal for the FA approach is to deter artificial
allocation of values by MNCs, which will in turn give prominence to the taxing rights of source
countries.
1.4 Literature Review on CBCR
The subject matter of CBCR has also received review by scholars. Maria T. Evers, Ina Meier and
Christoph Spengel for instance discuss the import of CBCR as an effective measure to combat
BEPS.69 They argue that even if CBCR has prospects in the fight against profit shifting, the
expected benefits exceed the related costs.70 For instance, they note that CBCR may just be an
avenue for tax administrations to know about the global activities of MNCs but not as a tool to
fight against BEPS. Their argument is premised on the weaknesses of the arm’s length principle,
67
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specifically the inability to ascertain the appropriateness of transfer prices declared by MNCs with
the principle. Considering the fact MNCs utilize the opportunities inherent in transfer pricing to
erode profits, with the ineffectiveness of the arm’s length principle to verify the appropriateness
of transfer prices fixed, Evers, Meier and Spengel conclude against the prospects of the CBCR as
a tool to end BEPS.
Arthur J. Cockfield and Carl D. MacArthur examine one of the provision of the Rules: the
confidentiality clause in the OECD’s CBCR Rules against the argument that this clause would
affect negatively the trade activities of MNCs when implemented.71 Their assessment of the
empirical studies on this subject reveal that there are two opposing positions. The first position is
that MNCs withhold information because of trade and confidentiality concerns while the second
position is that MNCs withhold information to hide their BEPS-related activities which they
engage to shift profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low or nil-tax jurisdictions.

Cockfield,

MacArthur72 and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah73 broadly examine the issue of corporate privacy under
Canadian law and the US law respectively. They all argue that corporate entities lack the right to
privacy.
Evidently, scholars have different perceptions about the context in which the problem of BEPS
arises and have proposed solutions to BEPS in line with their perceptions. This thesis considers
the implications of these different proposals and settles for the formulary apportionment approach
(using sales, payroll, and tangible assets as allocating factors) as the most viable approach to deter
BEPS. The thesis further examines the substantive provisions of the country-by-country Reporting
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Rules in the context of the OECD’s declared objective to end BEPS globally. Since the provisions
of the CBCR Rules have not been expanded upon by scholars, it is safe to say that this thesis makes
an original contribution to international tax discipline in this regard.
1.5 Research Questions
BEPS produces detrimental consequences across jurisdictions. More importantly, it is a challenge
that would remain if significant actions are not taken by states to effectively address its root cause.
The OECD is at the forefront of the global fight against BEPS via its BEPS project. This is why
this thesis examines the implications of this effort from two angles and asks two specific questions.
First, what are the implications of the OECD’s CBCR Rules in the context of the OECD’s global
fight against BEPS? Second, to what extent is the arm’s length principle effective in the global
fight against BEPS?
This thesis makes the following claims. First, the transfer pricing rules leave room for MNCs to
further engage in BEPS related activities, and thus a non-viable approach by which to fight BEPS
globally. Second, the OECD’s CBCR Rules, though having a lofty objective, fail to serve as an
effective composite tool capable of being utilized by states to end BEPS globally. Third, drawing
on the literature, I argue that the nature of the business activities of MNCs prevents an effective
application of the arm’s length principle as a solution to abusive transfer pricing. Fourth, I argue
that the unitary taxation (formulary apportionment) approach (using the trident formula) is best in
aligning profit with value creation and preventing BEPS.
The OECD’s approach to BEPS is structured as if the challenge is a legal problem. This is why it
requires national enactment of rules to implement measures for the purpose. This thesis argues that
though the interaction of the different investment laws encourages BEPS, the root cause of BEPS
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is what the OECD must address. The appropriate question ought to be “what makes BEPS
possible,” rather than “what are the loopholes in the international tax system that encourage
BEPS”. A legocentric approach for tackling an economic problem comes across as a round peg
trying to fit into a square whole. If it were the case that the business structures of MNCs allow
them to artificially attribute profits to jurisdictions, and it appears impossible to have power over
how and what profits MNCs declare, the solution that this thesis proposes is a viable approach that
ensures that only the profits commensurate to economic activities are apportioned across
jurisdictions.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The research questions highlighted above are addressed under six chapters, including this chapter,
that set out the theme of discussion, which is the problem of BEPS, the OECD’s approach in
combatting BEPS globally through the CBCR Rules, and alternative approaches to end BEPS
globally. In this chapter, I also discuss, briefly, the existing problems in international taxation
which the CBCR Rules were designed to solve. Chapter 2 examines in detail the root cause of
BEPS; transfer mispricing and low tax rates by tax havens. This chapter also discusses the effect
of BEPS on the fundamental notion of “tax justice”, the impact of BEPS on the fiscal rights of
states, and the consequences of BEPS on national and global economies. The purpose of this
chapter is to discuss BEPS considering the factors responsible for it, and to understand the
magnitude of the consequences of the BEPS activities of MNCs on source countries, other
taxpayers, and the significance of taxation as a legitimate source of revenue. Chapter 3 discusses
previous attempts by the OECD and the UN to end BEPS in source countries through the harmful
tax competition report by the OECD in 1998, current transfer pricing rules, and the gaps in those
attempts. Chapter 4 is the crux of this thesis. In this chapter, I assess the objectives and key
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provisions of the CBCR Rules considering the problems which the Rules were designed to solve.
I identify gaps in the provisions of the Rules and propose amendments in alignment with the
OECD’s objective to end BEPS globally. Other than the assessment of key provisions of the CBCR
Rules, I assess the compatibility of the CBCR Rules with the arm’s length principle in the fight
against BEPS in Chapter 5. My assessment reveals that the problem of BEPS may remain unsolved
with the CBCR Rules, even if amended. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the differing
situations in the 1930s when the arm’s length principle was adopted and, now where globalization
makes it increasingly difficult for source countries to effectively tax multinational corporation
profits through the individual accounts of MNC entities. Therefore, I make a proposal for the
formulary apportionment approach to replace the arm’s length principle. This alternative approach
apportions business profits to states according to the level of their contributions to real economic
activities, such as sales, payroll and tangible assets which generated such profits. I argue that this
alternative approach works best with the CBCR rules as a tool to combat BEPS globally if the
rules are amended to reflect the changes which I propose in chapter 4 of this thesis. I conclude my
arguments in this thesis in Chapter 5 and sets out clearly my recommendations on the OECD’s
declared intent to end BEPS globally through the CBCR Rules.
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Chapter 2
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): Nature of the Problem

2.0 Introduction
As stated in chapter 1, the objective of this thesis is to assess the viability of the OECD’s Countryby-Country Reporting Rules (CBCR Rules), proposed in the context of its declared global fight
against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). This chapter discusses two root causes of BEPS:
activities of tax havens and transfer pricing by MNCs.1 It also examines the revenue consequences
that BEPS creates for states, the future of the fundamental fiscal right of states, and the fairness of
corporate income taxation as a tool to fulfil fiscal policies in general. The focus of this chapter is
the magnitude of the problem of BEPS, which the OECD seeks to end through the application of
CBCR Rules. This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section, section 2.0, gives
background on the BEPS phenomenon and harmful tax competition, and differentiates it from
unharmful tax competition, that which does not produce BEPS. Flowing from the background
about BEPS provided in section 2.1, section 2.2 discusses the use of transfer pricing by MNCs as
a cause of BEPS. This section explains the underlying reasons why MNCs utilize tax avoidance
strategies in general, and in particular, the transfer pricing strategy for corporate tax avoidance. It
offers detail on how transfer pricing is utilized by MNCs to cause BEPS, giving practical examples.
In the same vein, section 2.3 discusses how tax havens engender BEPS. Moving away from the
causes of BEPS identified in sections 2.2 and 2.3, sections 2.4 - 2.6 discuss the implications of
BEPS first on the corporate tax base of states, then, on the fiscal rights of states, and lastly, on the
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See for instance Lorraine Eden infra note 25 at 208; Kleinbard infra note 16. See generally sections 2.0 – 2.3 for
the discussion of BEPS including its root causes; transfer pricing by MNCs and activities of tax havens.
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notion of tax justice both for states and for taxpayers other than MNCs in sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6
respectively.
2.1 What is BEPS?
The OECD says that “BEPS relates chiefly to instances where the interaction of different tax rules
leads to double non-taxation or less than single taxation. It also relates to arrangements that
achieve no or low taxation by shifting profits away from the jurisdictions where the activities
creating those profits take place.”2 This definition points out that the root cause of BEPS is the
strategic shifting away (eroding) of profits from where they were generated (source countries), and
moving these profits into tax havens. The combination of these two activities is what makes BEPS
possible. In other words, failure to attach multinational corporation profits to source countries is
what causes BEPS, and this affects the fundamental design of the tax system.3
BEPS is a major problem that confronts governments the world over. Although it does not appear
as a new development in the history of taxing MNCs4, its effect is increasingly being felt by
governments, especially because of the consequences it continues to create for countries, despite
concerted efforts to obviate its causative factors.5 Initially, the problem of BEPS was categorized
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OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing at 10 (emphasis supplied).
Michael Devereux, Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations,
(2008) 24 Oxford REV. ECON. POL’Y 698 at 713.
4
Pascal Saint-Amans, “What the BEPS are we talking about”: www.oecd.org/forum/what-the-beps-are-we-talkingabout.htm (last accessed 10th June 2017).
3
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Countries are spending time discussing the issue of BEPS and ways to address it, see for instance, G20
Leaders Declaration Los Cabos, Mexico, June 19, 2012: www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619loscabos.html. This declaration generated the OECD BEPS Action Plans. There are also national
discussions centred around ways to deter BEPS, see for instance, Julie Martin “U.K Puts Executives in
Hot Seat Over Transfer Pricing Practices”, (2012) Worldwide Tax Daily 221-4; Australia’s Assistant
Treasurer, Minister Assisting for Financial Services & Superannuation and Minister for Competition
Policy & Consumer Affairs , David Bradbury’s Speech to Taxation Institute of Australia’s 28th National
Convention “Stateless Income: A threat to National Sovereignty” (2013):
<www.ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2013/003.htm&pageID=005&min=dj
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as “fiscal fraud” occasioned unilaterally by the fiscal policies and laws of tax havens. 6 There is
now recognition that it is the non-harmonization of national rules affecting taxation of
multinational corporation profits that gives rise to BEPS.7 BEPS affects both developed and
developing countries. This might be the reason why the OECD is being aggressive to deter it,
though, ironically, some of its members are considered to be tax havens.8
BEPS activities by MNCs is an important topic because of the significance of MNCs to the global
economy.9 The severity of BEPS on national economies and the global economy is discussed fully
later in this chapter, specifically in section 2.4. However, it is important to highlight the severity
of revenue loss to countries, estimated as amounting to eighty per cent of the world economy.10 In
terms of revenue, BEPS affects developing countries more than developed countries.11 According

ba&Year=&DocType> ; European Commission Recommendation Regarding Measures Intended to
Encourage Third Countries to Apply Minimum Standards of Good Governance in Tax Matters (2012):
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_e
vasion/c_2012_8805_en.pdf> ; European Commission, “Anti-tax avoidance Package” :
www.ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package_en EC ; BRICS
states take next step towards BEPS implementation, (2016): <www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/blog/transferpricing/brics-states-take-next-step-towards-beps-implement>
6

See OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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See also Dhammika Dharmapala and James R. Hines, “Which Countries Become Tax Havens?” Journal of Public
Economics, Vol. 93, 0ctober 2009, 1058-1068; Tax Justice Network, “Identifying Tax Havens and Offshore Finance
Centers: < www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Identifying_Tax_Havens_Jul_07.pdf . The OECD’s gray list is posted
at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/42497950.pdf ; 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report,
International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as
Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions, GAO-09-157, December 2008 cited by Jane Gravelle, “Tax Havens:
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion” (2015), Congressional Research Service,
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf at 4.
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Prem Sikka and Hugh Willmott infra note 34 at 6; see also Mahmood Monshipouri, Claude E. Welch, Jr., Evan T.
Kennedy, “Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities” Human
Rights Quarterly (2003) 965–989 at 966.
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to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in
developing countries since the early 1980s has tripled to about thirty per cent. 12 As such, tax
revenue forms a significant source of income for developing countries, and BEPS poses a huge
threat to their tax base.13 Not only does BEPS pose a serious threat to national economies and, in
turn, the global economy, it also violates the notion of “fairness/justice/equity” in taxation, as well
as the fiscal rights of states.14 In short, the problem of BEPS, which the OECD seeks to address,
is fundamental to both states and their citizens.
Globalization elevated commerce from rudimentary trade within national borders to transnational
business transactions.15 This significant development in world history, however, has deleterious
consequences, one of which is BEPS by MNCs.16 Using ingenious tax avoidance strategies, MNCs
move profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions to maximize their global profits.17
Although market forces are known to regulate demand and supply in the economics of trade,
unfortunately, economic factors are distorted by MNCs when they engage in profit shifting
because of the privilege that international taxation affords them to exercise their discretion in
allocating profits to jurisdictions.18 Consequently, MNCs exploit this privilege to shift profits from
a high- to a low-tax jurisdiction, for example by maximising expenses in the former and revenue
in the latter. Kleinbard gives a practical illustration of how MNCs engage in tax planning activities
in the US context, where a foreign tax credit system prevails:
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IMF Policy Paper (2014) “Spillovers In International Corporate Taxation”:
www.imf.org/external/pp/ppindex.aspx at 6-7.
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Ibid. Figure 1. “Revenue from the Corporate Income Tax in Percent of Total Revenue” at 7.
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Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen, “Redistribution, Globalization, and Multi-Level Governance” (2014) 1:1 MOPP 6181 at 62.
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…The firm’s tax director functions as the master distiller, confronted by hundreds of casks
of foreign income, one cask sits waiting to be tapped by the master distiller as needed, and
each drum of foreign income drawn from a cask brings with it a different quantum of
foreign tax credits. The master distiller takes instructions from the chief financial officer
as to how much cash must be repatriated to the United States each year, and then sets about
perfecting a blend of income and credits so that the residual U.S. tax on the resulting liqueur
is as small as possible.19
Similarly, tax havens utilize the advantage of mobility of capital in international trade to attract
MNC income through their fiscal policies, with such fiscal policies producing negative fiscal
externalities.20 In a world that is characterized by freedom of fiscal choices without external
interference, countries engage their policy tools to attract investment. This is termed “tax
competition”, which Ring defines as follows:
…a country’s use of any feature of its tax system to “enhance” its competitive advantage
in the marketplace for capital, investment, and/or nominal business presence. The tax
features readily susceptible to enlistment in this mission include tax rates, tax base,
administrative system transparency, disclosure, information sharing, and special credits,
exemptions and deduction.21
Although tax competition in itself is not detrimental, it turns out to be detrimental when it
engenders BEPS in other countries and becomes “harmful tax competition”. It is harmful because
other countries, including their citizens, suffer from the fiscal policies of tax havens. As such, the
critique of tax havens is not solely because of their low tax rates which of course is an exercise of
their sovereignty. The critique is directed at the fiscal policies and activities of tax havens which
encourage aggressive tax planning activities of MNCs and private individuals thereby causing
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other states to suffer revenue losses.22 In other words, the difference between the grant of fiscal
incentives which engender BEPS, and the use of fiscal policies by states to attract actual investment
lies in the objective economic consequences. Arguably, tax competition would exist even in the
absence of tax havens but it may be impossible for harmful tax competition to exist in the absence
of tax havens. To buttress this salient point, Dietsch and Rixen note: “tax competition for FDI is
illegitimate when it both is strategically motivated and leads to a reduction in the aggregate level
of fiscal self-determination of other states”.23 They term this: “virtual tax competition”, and
differentiate it from “actual tax competition” which does not cause harm to other states because
there is a genuine economic activity being carried on by MNCs.
The use of tax incentives to attract and retain MNCs is necessary for states in a globalized era, and
indispensable where investment and income flows between countries are not in balance.24 Actual
tax competition, therefore, does not engender BEPS.25 The bottom line is that the use of incentives
by states to attract MNC profits which are produced in other states, thereby depriving those other
states of their returns, is what engenders BEPS.

Harmful tax competition by tax havens and transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs are two distinct
yet complementary primary factors responsible for BEPS globally. 26 Tax havens, through fiscal
incentives, lure MNCs to establish business entities in their jurisdictions. Low tax rates are one
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notorious strategy utilized by tax havens. Heckemeyer and Overesch’s empirical research which
synthesize evidence from twenty-five studies on the subject reveal that tax rates are significant
factors considered by MNCs in their location decisions.27 MNCs have always considered tax rates
differentials before establishing entities across jurisdictions.

For instance, Grubert and Mutti

conducted a research on US MNCs using 1982 data on a cross section of thirty-three countries.28
They found that host country taxes and tariffs are important decision factors for MNCs in
determining where they will locate their production. They also found that MNCs take advantage
of tax planning opportunities by shifting taxable income to low-tax countries, thereby eroding the
base of high-tax countries.29

The concept of BEPS examined above identifies tax havens as one of the causes of BEPS. The
next section looks in detail at how their activities engender BEPS.
2.2 Tax Havens as a Cause of BEPS
This section discusses the tax haven phenomenon. It argues that the fiscal policies of tax havens,
which encourage the aggressive tax planning activities of MNCs, contribute significantly to the
BEPS problem. The discussion first delves into the nature of a tax haven.
2.2.1 What are Tax Havens?
Tax havens are countries that feed on income generated in other countries but transferred into them
by MNCs through tax avoidance strategies.30 Tax havens maintain lax fiscal policies to attract the
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28
Harry Grubert & John Mutti, “Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporate Decision Making”,
(1991) 73:2 The Review of Economics and Statistics 285-293.
29
Ibid.
30
Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, “Tax competition with parasitic tax havens”, Journal of Public Economics 93
(2009) 1261–1270.

34

foreign profits of MNCs, and they remain active despite national31 and international actions against
them.32 The policies and activities of tax havens easily give them away: they leverage on the ability
of MNCs to move capital across jurisdictions into their jurisdictions. This is why they consistently
maintain low-tax rates to encourage profit shifting from other jurisdictions.33
The OECD notes that tax havens can be identified by certain key features, as follows: Nil, or only
nominal taxes; lack of effective exchange of information; lack of transparency; and no substantial
activities.34 More prosaically, Shaxson says a tax haven is “a place that seeks to attract business
by offering politically stable facilities to help people or entities get around the rules, laws, and
regulations of jurisdictions elsewhere”.35 Picciotto defines them in terms of their activities being
the root cause of BEPS: “…A tax haven is a country which has facilities specially aimed or adapted
to enable avoidance or evasion of another country’s laws or regulations, such as tax, usually for
the benefit of non-residents of the haven”.36
According to the OECD, tax havens serve three purposes: they provide a location for holding
passive investments (“money boxes”); they provide a location where “paper” profits can be
booked; and they enable the affairs of taxpayers, particularly their bank accounts, to be effectively
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shielded from scrutiny by tax authorities of other countries”.37 Due to the nature of the activities
performed by tax havens, they exemplify harmful tax competition between states; that is, they
create a situation where states compete for foreign investment without substantial link to those
investments. Apeldoorn describes this as “virtual tax competition”.38 The succeeding subsection
examines how tax havens engender BEPS.
2.2.2 How Tax Havens Engender BEPS
The use of tax havens as instruments for profit shifting by MNCs began after 1950, according to
Picciotto.39 The reason there is so much attention on them is because they are home to “shell
branches”, “brass plates companies, partnerships, and trusts”, that is, entities of MNCs with
insignificant functions but in possession of majority of MNC profits.40 As discussed in section
2.1, it is not just the lax fiscal policies and activities of tax havens which subject them to criticisms
by other states. The influence of tax havens on MNCs’ global trade as well as the consequences
which their policies create for other states in terms of revenue loss are the reasons why there is so
much attention on them.
It has been estimated that almost half of all world trade passes through tax havens, though they
account for only 3 per cent of the world’s GDP.41 The Tax Justice Network suggested in 2005 that
approximately US$ 11.5 Trillion in assets were held offshore.42 As far back as 1990, Hines and
Rice estimated that the fiscal incentives of tax havens attract a quarter of US foreign investment
and a third of their foreign profits.43 In 2013, Keightley also looked into the extent to which US
37
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MNCs were involved in profit shifting. He found that the profits declared by US MNC entities in
“tax preferred”, “tax haven” countries or profit sanctuaries according to Surrey, 44 are
disproportionate to the level of business activities carried on in those jurisdictions. The tax havens
he identified in his report are Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
He compared the amount of profits which US MNCs reported in these tax havens to those declared
in traditional economies such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Mexico, and the United Kingdom.
He found that there were incidences of overallocation of profits to tax havens and underreporting
of profits in traditional economies. For instance, he notes that:
American companies reported earning forty-three per cent of overseas profits in Bermuda,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in 2008, while hiring four per cent
of their foreign workforce and making seven per cent of their foreign investments in those
economies. In comparison, the traditional economies of Australia, Canada, Germany,
Mexico and the United Kingdom accounted for fourteen per cent of American MNCs
overseas’ profits, but forty per cent of foreign hired labor and thirty-four per cent of foreign
investment.45
MNCs with operation in developing countries also erode profits from these jurisdictions and
transfer them to tax havens. In 2013, Christian Aid, a non-governmental organization, conducted
research on 1,525 MNCs operating in India. Their research shows that MNCs which have links
with tax havens engage in profit shifting “more intensely” than those MNCs with no tax haven
links.46
In sum, transfer mispricing and harmful tax competition by tax havens are fundamental causes of
BEPS. The statistics quoted above evidence that transfer pricing and the fiscal policies of tax
havens are significant contributors to the BEPS problem. This points to the need for insight into
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the revenue impacts that BEPS has on national economies and the global economy, as well as on
the notion of “tax justice” and on the fiscal rights of states. Sections 2.4 - 2.6 take up these
concerns.
2.3 Transfer Pricing as a Cause of BEPS
Transfer pricing is one of the notorious strategies which MNCs utilize to engage in profit shifting.47
The use of this strategy by MNCs automatically implies profit shifting. This section discusses the
nature of transfer pricing as a tool by MNCs to engender BEPS. Specifically, I examine the
rationale behind the use of this strategy and the ease with which MNCs utilize it to minimize their
global profits. Literature on international taxation is replete with facts and figures proving that
transfer pricing contributes significantly to the problem of BEPS.48
Picciotto provides a broad definition of transfer pricing: “The term transfer pricing is usually used
pejoratively, to refer to the mispricing of cross-border transactions for an illegitimate purpose such purposes include not only reducing tax liability, but also evading currency controls, and
concealing the origins of funds transferred abroad, especially funds derived from criminal activity
or corruption”.49
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Transfer pricing by MNCs involves the allocation of profit and loss on both tangible and intangible
property from the transnational business activities of an MNC to its business entities in
jurisdictions where they operate. MNCs enjoy the privilege of fixing prices on their transactions.50
This privilege, however, comes with the deleterious disadvantage of BEPS by MNCs. BEPS is
engendered through transfer pricing when there is misallocation/mispricing51 of profits/losses on
both intra-firm transactions and transactions with third parties. Such misallocation, consequently,
erodes revenue from source jurisdictions and transfers them to countries with possibly no
legitimate link to those revenues. Sikka and Willmott discuss the link between the discretion which
globalization affords MNCs in allocation of profits/losses and BEPS as follows: “…Such
discretion can enable them to minimise taxes and thereby swell profits by ensuring that, wherever
possible, most profits are located in low-tax or low risk jurisdictions”.52
Other than transfer pricing, there are many other tax avoidance strategies. They include allocation
of debt and earnings stripping (thin capitalization), contract manufacturing, check-the-box hybrid
entities and hybrid instruments, cross-crediting and sourcing rules for foreign tax credits53, and
double-Irish and treaty shopping.54.These strategies are used because MNCs see tax as a cost to be
minimized.55 As such, they are encouraged to invest billions of dollars into the tax avoidance
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industry to ensure that they pay minimal taxes on their global profits.56 Sikka and Willmott
pinpoint the significance of transfer pricing to MNCs as follows: “Reducing or eliminating taxes
is attractive to corporations as it boosts shareholder value, post-tax earnings and returns to
shareholders. It also increases company dividends and executive rewards as these are linked to
reported earnings. Since the amount of tax payable is dependent on ‘costs’ and ‘income’, corporate
attention becomes more intently focused on ‘transfer pricing’ strategies”.57 They further explain
that the “politics of transfer pricing”, that is, the establishment of subsidiaries, affiliates, joint
ventures, trusts, and other special purpose vehicles by MNCs for the purpose of avoiding taxes in
high-tax jurisdictions, enables them to take advantage of low taxes and subsidies in low-tax
jurisdictions.58
This seemingly overbroard discretion that MNCs have regarding allocation of profits, is, ironically,
one of the main reasons for which they exist.59 Therefore, it ought not be surprising to discover
that MNCs engage in transfer “mispricing”. Fuest and Riedel affirm this:
The concept of income shifting raises the question of whether a true or objective
distribution of profits earned by the individual entities of a multinational firm can be
identified. Achieving this is complicated for a number of reasons. In particular, the entities
of multinational firms typically jointly use resourced specific to the firm such as a common
brand name or firm-specific expertise. Pricing these resource flows appropriately is
difficult because goods traded between unrelated parties are usually different. It is an
important characteristic of many multinational firms that the individual entities jointly use
resources that could not be used in the same way if they were separate firms.60
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Therefore, without effective regulation of the prices reported by MNC entities, it is obvious that
the possibility of BEPS cannot be ruled out. There is widespread use of transfer pricing strategies
for income shifting. On this, Baker notes: “I have never known a multinational, multibillion-dollar,
multiproduct corporation that did not use fictitious transfer pricing in some part of its business to
shift money between some of its entities”.61 In sum, MNCs place priority on profit maximization
over their fiscal obligations to states where those profits are generated, hence the utilization of
aggressive tax avoidance strategies through transfer pricing. The intricacies of the transfer pricing
strategy as a cause of BEPS is discussed in the next subsection.
2.3.1 How Transfer Pricing Engenders BEPS
The preceding discussion highlights that MNCs engage in transfer pricing strategies to adjust their
profits and losses across jurisdictions where they operate. The techniques utilized for this exercise
are important to understand, beginning with what functions transfer pricing performs.
Transfer pricing performs two functions. First, it acts as a managerial tool for coordinating the
production and sales decisions of different business segments of an MNC with the objective to
enable a decentralized firm to achieve its full profit potential.62 Second, and relevant to the
discussion in this chapter, is the fact that “transfer pricing is not just an accounting technique, but
also a method of resource allocation and avoidance of taxes that affects distribution of income,
wealth, risks and quality of life”.63 The transfer pricing leading to BEPS concerns is best described
as “transfer price manipulation or abusive transfer pricing”.64
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As a strategy for BEPS, transfer pricing enables MNCs to tamper with real activities of their
entities that occur across jurisdictions, to allocate profits/losses unilaterally across states so they
can maximize after-tax profits.65 Because of the legality of tax avoidance and the privilege afforded
to MNCs to allocate profits across jurisdictions, it is possible for firms to adjust transfer prices in
a tax-sensitive fashion without violating any laws.66 Kleinbard notes that three transfer pricing
strategies which MNCs engage to avoid taxes are cost sharing arrangements, aggressive
contractual terms, and business opportunity.67 He explains that many cost sharing arrangements
are a strategic assignment by MNCs to their entities located in tax havens so that they may bear
the responsibility of developing assets for the benefit of the MNC business. Once those assets are
developed, the MNC entity licences them to affiliates for a charge usually “designed to reflect the
potential value of a successful product in the EU, as compared to the rest of the world.”68
Regarding the second transfer pricing strategy, aggressive contractual terms, especially for
intangibles69, Kleinbard explains: “In a world where licences of high-value internally-created
intangibles have no observable market value and where the arm’s length principle itself fails to
assign the synergies created by operating as a multinational enterprise, firms can be expected to
adopt intragroup contractual terms that favour low-taxed affiliates.”70 Lastly, Kleinbard points to
the use of business opportunity strategies by MNCs. These are utilized by MNCs to strategically
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locate business entities where they are sure to be profitable and able to maximize their profits.71
The significance of these three transfer pricing strategies lies in the peculiarity of the chain of
economic activities which take place within an MNC group. First, the MNC structure makes it
difficult to ascertain the genuineness of the transfer prices fixed by MNC entities. Second,
ownership of intangible assets by MNCs because of their level of profitability72 compel MNCs to
expand their operations to other jurisdictions73 including tax havens for profit maximization
purposes.
The Russian arrangement fits best into the third type of transfer pricing strategy that Kleinbard
identifies, namely, the use of business opportunities. This strategy is also reflected in the overvaluation of quoted prices on equipment, parts and raw materials, which is identified as another
strategy for base erosion in China’s automotive industry.74 Aggressive contractual terms were used
by Worldcom (before it went bankrupt) through “creative use of transfer pricing for a variety of
trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, brands, service marks and intellectual property”.75 This
strategy enabled Worldcom to create an intangible asset named “management foresight” which it
licensed to its entity in a low-tax jurisdiction. This entity, in turn, licensed the asset to other
affiliates for annual royalty payments. The anticipated tax savings from the use of this strategy
was US$25 million in the first year and US$170 million over five years. Over the 1998-2001 fiscal
years, over US$20 billion accrued in royalties as payments, mostly for the intangible asset, which
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was estimated to have exceeded Worldcom’s consolidated net income in each of the years 19982001, and in other cases, represented 80 to 90 percent of its subsidiary’s net income.76
Transfer mispricing is not restricted to developed countries. For instance, it was estimated that
Papa New Guinea lost $9-17 million or, as recently estimated, $100 million77 to transfer mispricing
in its forestry sector.78 Sikka and Willmott report that the underlying reasons behind this significant
loss of revenue in Papua New Guinea was that: “logging companies are grossly understating the
value of timber exported . . .. timber exports are laundered through the overseas subsidiaries of
companies exporting the timber. Importers buy the timber from the subsidiaries at much higher
prices than those declared to the PNG [Papua New Guinea] tax office at the point of export”.79
Specifically, MNCs regularly engage in transfer mispricing of intangibles because their value is
hard to ascertain.80 Brauner notes the uniqueness of MNC intangibles, their significance to MNC
business and governments, and the difficulties tax authorities face in valuing them.81 In regard to
their importance to global trade, he observes: “Intangibles are not just important... they generate
significant income for MNEs. Intangibles also generate significant benefits for governments, and
such governments struggle with MNEs and between themselves over the taxing rights of the
income generated by these intangibles”.82
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In sum, the cost and efficiency benefits which MNCs derive from the discretion to independently
fix prices on both tangible and intangibles account for the widespread use of transfer pricing
strategies by these entities to lower their tax obligations. Concurrently, considering that MNC tax
obligations depend on the amount they declare as “costs” and “expenses”, they are intently focused
on utilizing transfer pricing strategies to lower their profits in high-tax countries. This way, they
erode these countries’ tax bases.83
2.4 Effect of BEPS on National Economies and Global Economy
The influence that MNCs have on national and global economies makes BEPS a serious cause of
concern for states. UNCTAD reported in 2011 that MNCs’ production generated value-added of
approximately $16 trillion in 2010, estimated to be about a quarter of global GDP and one-third of
world exports.84 Particularly, intra-firm trade contributes significantly to the global economy. The
OECD estimated in 2010, based on 2006 financial data, that related-party trade accounted for 712 per cent of world trade, and 8-15 per cent of OECD trade.85 MNCs have global relevance; of
the world’s top 100 economies, 69 are corporations.86 Given the influence of MNCs from the
statistics set out above, revenue loss from the BEPS activities of MNCs is one major consequence
for states. The graph below from the IMF87 reveals the percentage of corporate tax revenue
received by countries from 1980-2012.
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Although corporate income revenue forms a major source of revenue across jurisdictions,88 BEPS
has been a bane to increased revenue from corporate taxes. It is important to note, however, that
there is no precision as to the amount of revenue which countries have lost to BEPS.89 For instance,
on the impact of transfer pricing manipulation on global revenue, Eden notes that the strongest and
clearest evidence of transfer pricing manipulation comes from transaction-level studies of U.S
intra-firm import and export prices and from firm-level studies using Chinese tax data.90 As far
back as 1990, Hines and Rice, based on their research on US MNCs, found that offshore tax haven
affiliates of US corporations account for more than a quarter of US foreign investment. They found
that a quarter of US investment and a third of US foreign profits are locked out overseas.91
However, they did not attempt to determine the resulting tax revenue loss from the US.
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As to direct evidence of the relationship between transfer mispricing, harmful tax competition by
tax havens and BEPS, Clausing notes: “Intra-firm trade prices are likely influenced by the taxminimization strategies of multinational firms…there is a strong and statistically significant
relationship between a country’s tax rate and the prices of intrafirm imports and exports traded
with that country”.92 Globally, Clausing estimated the amount lost to BEPS worldwide in 2012 to
be in excess of US$ 280 billion.93 She also estimated the revenue lost to profit shifting by USheadquartered MNCs to the US government in 2008 as $57 billion and $90 billion94. The figures
increased in 2012 to US$77 billion and US$111 billion.95 US MNCs which have been said to be
responsible for revenue lost by the US government to profit shifting to tax havens are Apple 96,
Google97, and Starbucks98. The OECD estimated the loss from BEPS as US$100-240 billion
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annually, about 4-10 per cent of global corporate income revenue.99 Cobham and Jansky also
estimate global revenue losses from BEPS as US$500 billion annually.100
In regard to the impact of BEPS on developing countries’ economies, UNCTAD notes that
developing countries lose $100 billion annually to profit shifting to tax havens. 101 Deplorably,
UNCTAD notes that on average, across developing economies, every 10 percentage points of
offshore investment is associated with a 1 percentage point lower rate of return via tax.102 The
foregoing statistics reveals that there is no discrimination between states when it comes to BEPS.
It is, however important to note that developed countries lose more tax revenue from it. 103 The
following graphical representation indicates estimated BEPS losses to some major industrialized
states.
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Figure 2: The Global Cost of Tax Avoidance

Source: Nial McCarthy, “The Global Cost of Tax Avoidance”, Statista (2014), online:
<www.statista.com/chart/8668/the-global-cost-of-tax-avoidance/>
Although it appears that developed countries lose more revenue from BEPS, statistics show that
lower income countries are affected worst when measured as a share of GDP. The IMF estimates
that developing countries lose 1.3 per cent of their GDP to BEPS, compared to 1 per cent for
developed countries.104 According to an OECD official, Africa alone may be losing around $250
billion each year to BEPS, estimated to be approximately 7 to 8 per cent of its GDP annually,
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through tax avoidance schemes.105 Loss of revenue measured as a percentage of GDP reveals that
low-income countries lose more from BEPS. The graph below illustrates this.
Figure 3: Countries that lose the Most Revenue as a Result of Tax Avoidance

Source: Joe Myers, “Which Countries are Worst Affected by Tax Avoidance”, World Economic
Forum/United Nations World Institute for Development Economics Research, (2017), online:
<www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04which-countries-are-worst-affected-by-tax-avoidance>
Overall, although the figures estimated to be the amount of revenue lost to BEPS in countries
differ, the common ground is that both developed and developing countries lose revenue due them
because of BEPS. However, because developing countries rely more on corporate income taxes,
they are more affected by BEPS.106
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2.5 Effect of BEPS on Fiscal Sovereignty
Sovereignty is an inalienable feature of statehood. One of its attributes is the state’s ability to
exercise control over its subjects.107 There is a definite link between taxation and sovereignty. For
instance, Michael Graetz observes: “No function is more at the core of government than its system
of taxation”.108 Ring thinks tax sovereignty: “is a tool to achieve important missions of the
democratic sovereign state: (1) the continued operation and existence of a functioning government
(predicated on revenue and sustainable fiscal policy) and, (2) the accountability and legitimacy
underpinning that democratic state”.109 Christians emphasizes that “to speak of tax sovereignty is
generally to suggest that taxation is an inherent or essential component of sovereign status”.110
Consequently, it is generally accepted that “sovereign status seems to include a right to tax in some
form, so that infringing on the right of taxation is an infringement on sovereignty itself”.111
These affirmations of the importance of fiscal rights to states substantiate the international
principle of “territorial integrity” contained in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations112,
particularly paragraph 4 which forbids states from undermining mutual “territorial integrity or
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political independence … in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”.
Thus, to the extent that BEPS prevents states from exercising their rights to levy taxes on profits
derived within their jurisdictions, either as source or residence countries, it is safe to conclude that
tax havens undermine the fiscal rights of states and, in this sense, their political independence as a
function of entitlement to tax MNC profits that are generated within their jurisdiction. Put another
way, tax havens infringe on the fiscal rights of states because they deny states with genuine links
to MNC profits the right to tax them. This situation emasculates the desideratum that a tax system
should have effective control over the various elements of its tax base.113 The fiscal rights of states
are impeded when profits made within their jurisdictions, and ought to be taxed therein, are
reported by another MNC entity located in tax havens with insignificant links to the activities
which generated the profits in issue. The outcome is that states are unable to utilize fiscal policies
to fulfil the goals of taxation, which are: to raise revenue to provide public goods and other
government activities; to redistribute income and wealth according to the collective conception of
justice; and to smooth the economic cycle or stabilize economic conditions.114
It bears re-emphasizing that to the extent that the activities of tax havens promote BEPS, they are
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter, in chapter 1,
expresses its purposes and principles as the need for states to cooperatively promote and maintain
international peace and to respect the fundamental rights of all people.115 The Charter identifies
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that these goals can be reached through observing guiding principles of peace, justice, respect,
cooperation and harmonization.116
Arguably, as a matter of international law, the duty of states to respect each other’s rights extends
to fiscal rights. The Arbitration Tribunal of the United Nations pointed this out when it held in the
Island of Palmas117 case that: “Territorial integrity…has as a corollary duty: the obligation to
protect within the territory the rights of other states, … together with the rights which each state
may claim for its nationals in foreign territory. Without manifesting its territorial sovereignty in a
manner corresponding to circumstances, the state cannot fulfil this duty”.118 These broad principles
emphasize, in particular, reciprocal protection of sovereign interests. This obligation is directly
violated by the activities of tax havens which encourage BEPS. Fiscal sovereignty transcends any
justification for harmful tax competition practices. On the contrary, it demands fiscal coordination
among states which can only be possible when states respect the fiscal policies of others. 119 This
form of coordination becomes possible through the unilateral implementation of the principles of
peace, justice, respect, and harmonization, ideals established by the League of Nations as the
hallmarks of statehood as far back as 1945.120 The enjoyment of fiscal rights by each state requires
mutual respect for sovereignty translated as mutual protection for the right of a state to tax or not
to tax.121
Contrary to the foregoing, tax havens defend their BEPS policies and activities. They “resist efforts
to change harmful tax practices on the ground that these practices are valuable from their sovereign
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perspective (even if potentially inefficient globally)”.122 Ring tells us that: advocates for
competition identify not only the potential benefits of broad competition by tax systems but also
their inherent rights as sovereign states to design and utilize their tax systems to best support their
state.123 However, as argued earlier, the notion that states are independent and free to design their
policies without considering the effects that they have on other states does not apply in
international taxation. On this issue, Christians rightly observes that:
Thus if tax sovereignty means anything, perhaps it is the idea that governments have a nonexclusive right to decide through political means whether and how to tax whatever activity
occurs within their territories and whomever can be considered to be their “people,” and
that they recognize a reciprocal right in all other states. This duty for states to respect the
fiscal rights of others is embedded in the international law principle of comity and
reciprocity.124
Highlighting the importance of cooperation by all states as a necessary requirement in international
taxation, Ring again notes that: “The stereotyped concept of a sovereign state as independent from
all external forces and in complete control domestically, has been a fiction, and certainly is not
theoretically required today”.125
In sum, BEPS poses a threat to the fundamental right of states to exercise their fiscal rights. Fiscal
rights are what gives power to governments to fulfil their mandates, and can best be described as
the core of governance. Undermining this mandate brings to the fore other consequences that BEPS
produces. It is a major reason why states must collaborate to design an efficient and lasting
framework to eradicate BEPS because no society can function well without effective governance
founded on effective taxation as a core aspect of fiscal policy. The discussion in section 2.6
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discusses how BEPS infringes upon the need for fairness in taxation and revenue allocation
between and across jurisdictions.
2.6 Effect of BEPS on the Notion of “Tax Justice”
The term “justice” has widespread usage. According to Rawls, “Justice is the first virtue of social
institutions, as truth is of systems of thought”.126 When seeking redress for a wrong done to their
clients, lawyers seek justice in court, which, presumably, must administer the law to achieve
justice. Citizens seek justice against repressive rule, so do they against discriminatory policies and
laws.
International tax justice theorists argue against the injustice/unfairness attached to BEPS.127 In
terms of international taxation, the term “justice” can be used to describe the unfairness of
international/national taxation rules which encourage the aggressive tax planning activities of
MNCs and fiscal policies and activities of tax havens which promote BEPS. This
unfairness/injustice creates two fundamental consequences. First is the erosion of revenue from
source countries, which can be the country of residence of an MNC, or the country where the
economic activities that produce the profits in question occurred, or both. Second is the unfairness
which BEPS foists on other taxpayers who pay their fair share of taxes and must bear a greater tax
burden to make up for the revenue that is lost to BEPS.
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2.6.1 The Injustice/Unfairness BEPS Creates for States
As discussed above, justice in international taxation translates to the ability of states to achieve
policy goals by means of taxation,128 that is, states that have invested their resources in ways that
assist MNC profit generation being entitled to their due returns in the form of taxes. It is this
situation that tax justice attacks. Tax justice does not imply that states be equally affluent, as
Apeldoorn argues,129 but that they can interact justly under certain conditions. As Apeldoorn says:
“It does not require the global distribution of individual advantages to conform to some principle
of distributive justice, but rather that all states have the capacity to secure a just distribution of
advantages between their citizens.”130
For the purposes of taxing MNC profits, states can only interact justly when they implement fiscal
policies which respect the entitlements of source countries to tax MNC profits in deserving
circumstances. These circumstances would be the existence of significant ties to the profits in
question, specifically the fact that the economic activities which resulted in the profits being taxed
occurred either wholly or partly within their jurisdictions. Dietsch uses the phrase “legitimate tax
policy” to describe how the fiscal policies of states create unfairness/injustice for other states. He
states: “A tax policy is legitimate if it does not produce a collectively suboptimal outcome. A
collectively suboptimal outcome is here defined as one where the aggregate extent of fiscal selfdetermination of states is reduced”.131
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The notion of inter-nation equity argues against BEPS in terms of the effect it has on states. The
principle deals with international revenue sharing among states. Musgrave notes that “international
revenue sharing, as an aspect of the taxation of foreign investment, is a matter of inter-nation
equity…”132 Musgrave thinks that states can share this revenue as follows: “A country is expected
to share in the gains of foreign-owned factors of production operating within its borders, gains that
are generated in cooperation with its own inputs, whether they be natural resources, an educated
or low-cost workforce, or proximity to a market.”133 In her view, the equitable distribution of tax
ensures that countries are able to claim tax revenue in proportion to the budgetary services and
intermediate goods which they provide to the foreign investment.134 This principle, as Musgrave
explains, bears some relation to the benefit principle and will ensure that taxes are allocated to
countries in proportion to the value added to the final product in each country.135
Harmful tax competition, that is, the use of fiscal incentives by states to “lure” mobile capital that
is derived in other jurisdictions, is therefore an infraction of the inter-nation equity principle.136
On the international scene, injustice is perpetrated when countries which contribute to economic
activities producing multinational profits are prevented from taxing them, while countries which

132

Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: Issues and Arguments (Cambridge:
Law School of Harvard University, 1969) at 130
133
Peggy Musgrave, “Combining Fiscal Sovereignty and Coordination: National Taxation in a Globalizing World,” in
Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceicao, eds, The New Public Finance Responding to Global Challenges
(Oxford University Press 2006) 167 at 192.
134
Peggy B. Richman, Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic Analysis (1963, John Hopkins Press,
Baltimore) at 15.
135
Ibid at 26-7.
136
See Laurens Val Apeldoorn supra note 128 for a contrary view that harmful tax competition is the use of fiscal
incentives to lure both FDI and mobile capital but see Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen supra note 13 at 73 where
they state that competition for FDI, that is, “luring” MNCs to invest can only be considered illegitimate/ harmful if
it is strategically motivated and leads to a reduction in the aggregate level of fiscal self-determination of other
states.

57

contribute little or nothing to economic activities which generate such profits, namely, tax havens,
can keep them as an exercise of their fiscal independence.
Lastly, taking into consideration the fact that developing countries suffer more from BEPS in terms
of revenue loss, as established in section 2.4, it is safe to conclude that they are also the worst
affected by the tax injustice associated with BEPS. This conclusion is reinforced by the substantial
tax administration challenges that exist in developing countries which incapacitate them to detect
and combat BEPS, unlike developed countries. 137 To crown it all, developing countries, in a bid
to be part of the international taxation table, resort to the grant of tax incentives as a fall-back
option to attract foreign direct investment. Even though they do this at a loss138, they hold on to
this approach as the only way to get a slice from the large chunk of multinational corporation
profits.
2.6.2 The Injustice/Unfairness BEPS Creates for Taxpayers other than MNCs
Tax justice implies that appropriate taxes are paid on profits where they are earned and that states
utilize the revenue collected to promote the conception of the scheme of social justice that has
been chosen through their particular democratic processes.139 Social justice includes, first, the
obligation on all taxpayers, irrespective of their status, to pay their fair share of taxes in states
where their profits/income are generated, and second, the ability to use taxation to achieve social
objectives, such as balancing the gap between the rich and the poor for equality purposes.
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The principle of “inter-individual equity” summarizes the expectation that taxpayers pay their fair
share of taxes.140 For source and residence countries, this principle states that taxpayers with equal
income pay the same amount of tax, regardless of the source of their income.141 Also, this principle
suggests that individuals who benefit equally from government, including non-residents, should
contribute to the host country’s cost of governance.142 The inter-individual equity principle is used
to determine the relative benefits and burdens of different individuals and groups in the society.143
This principle can be equated to the principle of “horizontal equity” when MNCs are equally
situated with other taxpayers. The fundamental taxation principle of “horizontal equity” requires
that similarly situated taxpayers face similar tax burdens. 144 The avoidance of taxation by MNCs
through BEPS activities is a violation of these two significant principles. Elkins argues that
violation of the principle of “horizontal equity” is not fatal, but that it causes a serious flaw in any
proposed tax arrangement. However, given that BEPS creates severe consequences in terms of
revenue loss, and creates disparities between MNCs and other taxpayers when they are equally
situated, Elkins’ view that horizontal inequity in taxation is not fatal is highly questionable. The
OECD, evidenced in the graph below, exposes the distortions in national taxation occasioned by
inappropriate taxes paid by MNCs on profits derived from their global activities:
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Figure 4: OECD Revenue Statistics

Source: OECD (2016), Revenue Statistics 2016, OECD Publishing.
The graph reveals that there is imbalance in tax revenues as between private individual and
corporate taxpayers, although there are no statistics showing that these sets of taxpayers are
similarly situated. If they are, the outcome of this situation is regressive tax systems, the situation
whereby states broaden their tax bases to make up for lost revenue by shifting focus from capital,
which is capable of being moved offshore, to labour, which is immobile, and to indirect taxes, such
as consumption tax. Dietsch submits that developed countries have been successful in stabilizing
their economies through this approach, but not without the consequence of inequality which
regressive tax systems foist on other taxpayers.145 He concludes that one way to assess this
development, “is to say that OECD countries have bought fiscal stability in terms of revenue at
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the cost of a less redistributive system.”146 In contrast, developing countries are unable to stabilize
their economies through this approach because they lack the administrative resources to do so.147
The fiscal rights of states entail their ability to rely on the redistributive functionality of fiscal
policies to balance the circumstances of taxpayers to ensure that each one pays fair taxes, but not
more than each ought to pay. Therefore, to the extent that BEPS impedes this national right, it
threatens the redistributive functionality of taxation to achieve tax justice in each adversely
affected state.
In sum, BEPS deprives countries which have legitimate claims over multinational profits the right
to tax them, thus violating inter-nation equity. It also weakens the redistributive capacity of states
by which to secure equality within their jurisdictions through fiscal policies which promote
progressive tax systems. This latter consequence violates the inter-individual equity principle.
2.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, the discussion above reveals two important root causes of BEPS: transfer pricing
by MNCs and the activities of tax havens. The discussion notes that to understand BEPS, a
distinction must be made between “harmful tax competition” or “virtual tax competition” as the
cause of BEPS, and “unharmful tax competition” or “actual tax competition” which states may use
to attract foreign direct investment. The emphasis of the discussion is the severity of the
consequences which BEPS causes to states, namely, huge revenue loss, infringement of their
fundamental fiscal rights, and the injustice attached to the denial of tax revenue due them. Closely
associated with this is the unfairness and increased tax burden which the BEPS activities of MNCs
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foist on other taxpayers. The phenomenon also has deleterious consequences for future national
tax systems, given that developed countries shift towards regressive tax systems, and developing
countries operate at a loss from the grant of fiscal incentives.
Having discussed the magnitude of the BEPS problem in this chapter, the next chapter examines
the solutions that were earlier proposed by the OECD and the UN, namely, the OECD’s Harmful
Tax Competition Report of 1998 and the OECD and UN’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
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Chapter 3
The OECD and the UN’s Anti-BEPS Initiatives: An Assessment
3.0 Introduction
The severity of the consequences attached to BEPS mainly because of the unhealthy fiscal
practices by tax havens and transfer mispricing by some MNCs are explained in Chapter 2. Chapter
3 examines the gaps in the OECD harmful tax competition reports that hinder the global fight
against BEPS, and transfer mispricing by MNCs. The issues pursued by this Chapter are premised
on the understanding that MNCs leverage the integrated nature of their businesses to manipulate
transfer prices, and to transfer profits from source countries to tax havens where they benefit from
lax fiscal regimes. This Chapter examines the OECD’s work on harmful tax competition through
the three reports it issued in 19981, 20002 and 20043 and the harmful tax practices in which states
engage.
This Chapter also examines the efficiency of the arm’s length principle, which is designed to
regulate transfer prices fixed by MNC entities as contained under Article 9 of both the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)4 and the United Nations (UN)
Double Taxation Conventions.5 Altogether, this Chapter examines the potential of the OECD
Reports on harmful tax practices to proscribe harmful tax practices and the arm’s length principle
to counteract transfer mispricing by MNCs. The conclusion the discussion draws is that these two
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initiatives are flawed, which explains why harmful tax practices and transfer mispricing remain a
challenge to states.
This chapter is broadly divided into two sections. The first section covering 3.1 and 3.2 reviews
the OECD’s efforts to control harmful tax practices that states engage in and which encourage
BEPS. The second section. covering 3.3 to 3.6 examines the activities of the League of Nations,
the OECD and the UN regarding the arm’s length principle as a regulatory mechanism for transfer
pricing. More specifically, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 assess the OECD’s work on harmful tax
competition. Section 3.1 reviews the 1998, 2000 and 2004 OECD reports on harmful tax practices
by tax havens and preferential tax regimes, and Section 3.2 assesses the core provisions of these
reports as per the OECD’s objective to proscribe harmful tax practices. The assessment establishes
that the OECD’s work on harmful tax practices is fraught with significant inadequacies and this
explains why states still engage in harmful tax practices. Section 3.3 discusses the evolution of the
arm’s length principle through the work of the League on the separate entity principle. Section 3.4
reviews the development of the arm’s length principle under the OECD’s Double Taxation
Convention, and Section 3.5 examines the arm’s length principle under the UN Model Double
Taxation Convention. The overall assessment of the principle in Section 3.6 highlights its gaps
that leave opportunities for transfer mispricing. In conclusion, Section 3.7 highlights the findings
of the discussion, in particular, that the efforts of the OECD and the UN have failed to ameliorate
BEPS.
The arm’s length principle emerged from national efforts to harmonize fiscal laws bordering on
taxation of MNCs. This harmonization began in the 20th century through the work of the League
of Nations (the League). The League’s work focused on the allocation rules to govern how states
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share the profits from cross-border trade activities for tax purposes.6 The objective of the
harmonization was to divide MNC profits among states so as to prevent international double
taxation and to encourage free flow of capital.7 This approach led to the adoption of the “separate
entity principle”, which determines the yardstick for the allocation of taxing rights among states
summarized under the broader principle of “economic allegiance”.8 The principle of economic
allegiance embodies the right of source countries to levy income taxes on the profits of affiliates
or permanent establishments of non-resident MNCs produced in their jurisdictions.9
In 1933, the separate entity principle was extended by the League to address issues surrounding
how the combined profits of an MNC may be apportioned to PEs and affiliates and how states
were to tax such profits.10 It is this separate entity principle that the OECD modified and included
in Article 9 of its Double Taxation Convention, first adopted in 1963. The principle was
subsequently revised in 1977, 2010 and 201411 as the “arm’s length principle” and designed to
regulate transfer prices fixed by non-arm’s length parties. In 1979, the UN copied the OECD’s
arm’s length principle and included it in Article 9 of its Double Taxation Convention. 12 Both
Double Taxation Conventions, and nearly all double taxation treaties, maintain the arm’s length
principle as the standard by which to regulate transfer prices for transactions by non-arm’s length
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parties to prevent transfer pricing manipulation or abusive transfer pricing.13 In addition, both the
OECD and the UN have issued guidance on transfer pricing.14 This is intended to guide MNCs
when they fix transfer prices, and tax administrators when they examine the appropriateness of the
transfer prices fixed by MNCs.
3.1 The OECD and Harmful Tax Competition
The OECD’s work on harmful tax competition focuses on curbing BEPS promotion through the
fiscal policies and laws of member and non-member countries. In 1998, the OECD issued a Report
titled “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue.”15 It classified harmful tax
competition into two categories: tax havens and preferential tax regimes.16 Tax havens are defined
as states with the following features: no or nominal income taxes and at least one of three
characteristics: lack of effective exchange of information, lack of transparency, and lack of
substantial activities by taxpayers.17 It identified preferential tax regimes as states with the
following features: a no or low tax rate and at least one of the following: ring fencing, lack of
transparency, and lack of effective exchange of information.18 The Report provides a distinction
between tax havens and harmful tax preferential regimes. It points out that tax havens are
“countries that are able to finance their public services with no or nominal income taxes, and that
offer themselves as places to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their countries of
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residence”.19 It describes potentially harmful preferential tax regimes as “countries that raise
significant revenues from their income tax but whose tax system has features constituting harmful
tax competition”.20 Although the report did create a distinction between tax havens and preferential
tax regimes, the common denominator between these two is the presence of harmful tax practices
that erode the tax base of other countries.
The Report focused on how harmful tax practices within states, in relation to geographically
mobile activities such as financial and other service activities, that erode the tax bases of other
countries, distort trade and investment patterns and undermine the fairness, neutrality and
generally broad social acceptance of tax systems.21 Throughout the report, the OECD identified
the role that transparency and tax information exchange between member countries would play in
fighting BEPS.
In 2000, the OECD released a list of forty-seven member countries with harmful tax practices,
which it planned to include in its list of uncooperative tax havens unless they agreed to eliminate
harmful features from their laws.22 The OECD also listed thirty countries as tax havens in its 2000
report.23 Eventually, it included just seven countries in its list of uncooperative tax havens in 2002
because other countries that it initially identified as preferential tax regimes had given political
commitments to eliminate harmful tax practices within their jurisdictions.24 The OECD’s list of
tax havens had shrunk to three countries by 2009 when they were eventually removed because of
their political commitments to implement the OECD standards of transparency and effective
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exchange of information.25 The OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information continues to build on these reports to monitor the extent to which member states abide
by their commitments to eliminate harmful tax practices.26 The 1998 Report, on the provisions of
which subsequent reports on harmful tax competition are based, is now considered more fully.
3.2 The OECD’s 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition
Attempts by the OECD to prevent harmful tax practices by states ought to be commended,
however, its efforts carry some fundamental defects. The Report is flawed on two grounds:
internally, for ambiguity, and externally on the grounds of legitimacy, objectivity, and misplaced
priorities.
First, the Report does not clearly describe tax havens, nor does it provide guidance on indicators
it gave concerning the activities of states deemed to be tax havens.27 For instance, although the
Report mentioned “no substantial activity” as a qualifier of tax havens, the degree of such activity
is not prescribed.28 The same applies to “nominal tax rate”, one of the features of tax havens
highlighted by the OECD in its description of the activities of tax havens.29 As well, the OECD
does not specify the degree of the “sufficient amount of revenue” that a country is to receive from
income tax that would qualify it as a preferential tax regime instead of a tax haven or even qualify
that state as a preferential tax regime in the first instance.30 These gaps lead one to conclude that
the OECD’s lists of tax havens and preferential tax regimes are, at best, subjective.31 They leave
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the credibility of the Report in doubt in terms of its objective commitment to curbing harmful tax
practices.
More importantly is the issue of legitimacy of the OECD in its effort to eradicate BEPS globally.
From a legal perspective, the OECD’s efforts to proscribe the harmful tax practices of tax havens
over-reach its powers.32 The Report asks states to proscribe the fiscal regimes of others. This
undermines international comity, as such matters are normally handled through taxation treaties.33
The coercive nature of the report is evident in the sanctions declared to follow upon a country
ignoring its recommendations.34 Townsend declares that the absence of negotiation in the
processes that culminated in the Report usurps the fiscal right of states.35 Although the harmful tax
practices of tax havens are, in themselves, a breach of the fiscal right of other states, those practices
cannot be counteracted by issuing prescriptive norms and coercing states to design their fiscal
regimes as recommended.36 Overall, the OECD’s approach via its earlier reports contradicts
relevant principles of international law. Cooperation is essential when it comes to harmonization
of fiscal laws. This factor is also strong enough to nullify the OECD’s earlier work on harmful tax
competition.

Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition (2001) Fordham International Law Journal 25:1 at 256;
see also Javier G. Salinas, “The OECD Tax Competition Initiative: A Critique of its Merits in the Global Market Place”
(2003) 25:3 Houston Journal of International Law at 555.
32
See generally Diane M. Ring. "Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in
Shaping Tax Cooperation." (2009) Florida Tax Review 9, 555-596 for a discussion of the importance of cooperation
in harmonization of fiscal laws.
33
Eyal Benvenisti, “Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization”, (1999) 98 MICH. L. Rxv. 167, 167-68; see also
Townsend supra note 31 at 251; Javier G. Salinas, supra note 31 at 555.
34
See the 1998 Report note 1 at 158-61; and the 2000 Report supra note 2 at 36.
35
Townsend supra note 31 at 252-4.
36
Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, The Jurisdiction to Tax in International Theory and Practice of Legislative Fiscal
Jurisdiction (United States: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989)

69

Also, given the nature of BEPS, as discussed in Chapter 2, and the fact that it affects developing
countries more than it does developed countries37, one might think that the OECD is not a suitable
regulatory body for harmful tax competition. When the reports were issued, the OECD consisted
mainly of developed countries, save for Mexico and Turkey.38 However, given that BEPS is a
global problem, more so because it affects developing countries more severely, the question is the
legitimacy of leaving developing countries out of the fight against harmful tax practices/BEPS.
That not all states are included in this fight strongly suggests that the OECD might, after all, just
be protecting the interests of its members. Melo declares that the OECD’s work on harmful tax
competition is a technique to keep its monopolistic dominance in international trade by proscribing
the lax fiscal regimes in tax havens which may weaken its dominance.39 Well and Lowell also
provide insight into the original intention of the OECD when it was designing the allocation rules
and its aggressiveness in attempting to fix the BEPS problem.40 They maintain that the OECD’s
original intention was to strip source countries of the revenue accruing from the operations of nonresidents; hence the over-allocation of revenue to residence countries under the allocation rules in
the OECD Model Taxation Convention.41 They further explain that BEPS exists because the
operations of tax havens break the tie between source and residence countries and, instead of
MNCs transferring profits from source countries to residence countries, they now have an
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alternative, tax havens, which offer incentives that match their objective to reduce global costs and
maximize global profits.42
From a moral perspective, the OECD’s effort, reflected in the Report, fails the objectivity test.
First, some of its members engage in harmful tax practices and, over time, have shown their
disinterest in the OECD’s policy reforms.43 In addition, the OECD rules on allocation of profits
between source and residence countries contribute to BEPS in source countries.44 The rules can
apply to strip the income of non-resident MNCs from source countries to residence countries. This
happens, for example, because the rules proscribe the taxation of non-residents’ income if their
activities do not qualify as permanent establishments.45
Lastly, the Report leaves out the primary cause of harmful tax practices: transfer pricing
manipulation by MNCs. It is my contention that unless the primary cause of BEPS is addressed,
harmonization of fiscal laws by the OECD, even if it passes the legitimacy and objectivity tests,
would not yield practically beneficial results. It is important to note that the harmful tax practices
of states are a continuation of the BEPS activities of MNCs. MNCs erode the tax base of countries
first before the profits eroded are transferred to tax havens. It, therefore, follows that the most
effective way to address harmful tax practices of states is tackle the factors that make it possible
for MNCs to erode the tax base of countries in the first place. Chapter 2 illustrated that transfer
pricing is the tool most utilized by MNCs to erode the tax base of source countries. As such, the
gaps inherent in the arm’s length principle that make it possible for transfer mispricing must be
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critically examined. My analysis of these gaps in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 below make it safe to
conclude that the principle is not suited for effective taxation of the integrated transactions of
MNCs.
Overall, the OECD’s work on harmful tax competition is yielding little or no positive results,
especially in light of the severe consequences attached to BEPS, as discussed in Chapter 2. As
well, the OECD admits that more work is needed in the aspect of harmful tax practices.46 Tax
competition simpliciter is unharmful. But it becomes harmful when states, in a bid to fulfil their
fiscal interests, rob other states of taxable revenue due them.47 Tax havens engage in harmful tax
competition because they welcome income accruing from the activities of MNCs in other
jurisdictions (source countries). By this, they deprive source countries of their rights to tax these
profits.48 Harmful competition is a cause of BEPS and this is what the OECD sought to address
in its report. Harmful competition occurs when profits are displaced through the distortions MNCs
create when they transfer the majority of their revenues to tax havens from source countries.
3.3 Tracing the Evolution of the Arm’s Length Principle
As indicated in the introduction, the League of Nations began work harmonizing national fiscal
rules governing taxation of MNC profits with the aim to prevent international double taxation of
MNCs early in the 20th century. The goal was to prevent international double taxation in order to
promote cross-border trade.49 By this time, corporate businesses had transcended national borders
and there was need for coordination of the national fiscal laws of the different states where MNCs
46
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operated.50 For example, Picciotto records how British corporations which were, at this time, the
largest global investors of funds, took on, portfolio investment in the United States, Spain, South
Africa, and subsequently, delved into foreign direct investment in jurisdictions where minerals or
raw materials production took place prior to the first World War.51 He also notes the involvement
of US corporations in foreign direct investment in the automobile industry beginning in 1920.52
The interaction of states’ laws through these transnational transactions creates room for double
taxation of MNCs. The only way out of this, according to the League, was for states to treat MNC
entities separately for taxation purposes.53 This principle of separate treatment shaped the content
of subsequent reports by the League’s Fiscal Committee. For instance, in addressing the question
whether a non-resident entity should be taxed at source, the League restricted the taxing powers of
source countries to situations where the non-resident entity has a PE in the country, that is, an
entity operating in source countries with activities of a fixed nature.54
The arm’s length principle is an offshoot of the “separate entity principle”, traceable to the work
of the subcommittee of the Fiscal Committee of the League headed by Mitchell B. Carroll. The
subcommittee was set up in 1931 to consider and report on the allocation of profits to permanent
establishments.55 The subcommittee based its report on practices in jurisdictions such as the British
Commonwealth of Nations which consisted of the United Kingdom, the Irish Free State, British
India and South Africa; the United States of America; Canada56; Germany; and France and their
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declared preference for this method.57 The subcommittee also examined alternatives to the separate
accounting method: the empirical, and the fractional apportionment methods which these
jurisdictions reported they resort to when the separate accounting method fails.58 In the end, the
fiscal committee adopted the separate accounting method as the primary method of allocating
profits to the various countries in which an enterprise has permanent establishments.59
The empirical method was rejected as a primary method and was only to be employed when the
accounts of a permanent establishment being assessed are insufficient, or when no such accounts
are maintained at all.60 The same goes for the fractional apportionment method even in the face of
Spain’s proposal in support of it.61 The empirical approach is similar to the separate entity principle
but relies heavily on statistics. The Committee notes that in most instances, the empirical method
utilized is the percentage of turnover obtained through a comparison of percentage of net profit to
gross receipts of similar enterprises, or the percentage of gross profit to gross receipts from which
the expenses incurred by the affiliate or permanent establishment are deducted.62 The fractional
apportionment approach is a radical change from the arm’s length principle because it involves the
division of the general profits of an enterprise or two or more of its subsidiaries, and assignment
of taxable profits to a permanent establishment or affiliate based on the division.63 As a guide, the
committee prescribed that the weighted factor of these three economic activities be utilized: sales,
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tangible property, and working hours.64 To formalize the recommendations of the 1933 Fiscal
Committee, the League incorporated recommendations of the subcommittee into Article III of the
1935 Draft Convention for the Allocation of Business Income Between States.65
All through the revisions to the work of the League in 1940, 1943, and 1946 up until 1954 when
the League became defunct, the separate entity approach was preserved as the general principle
for allocation and taxation of MNC profits. Rules which divide MNC profits among states were
relegated to lesser status, such as the provisions of the 1928 treaty between Hungary and Poland,
which provided for fractional apportionment.66
Even though the League adopted the separate entity method as the primary method for allocating
taxable income to affiliates or permanent establishments, it gave no guidance on its applicability.
The League left this issue unresolved because of “conflicting viewpoints as to what is a fair transfer
price, charge or evaluation”.67 The League admitted that those issues are the exclusive preserve of
the enterprises rather than the tax authorities.68
Guidance on the application of the separate entity approach began in 1968 when the US released
four methods by which it could be applied.69 The methods proposed by the US were: comparable
uncontrolled pricing (the CUP); the resale profit; the cost-plus method; and, as a last resort, an
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unspecified “fourth method”.70 Well and Lowell say that these methods represent a continuation
of the work of the Fiscal Committee from 1933.71
3.4 Developing the Arm’s Length Principle: The OECD Double Taxation Convention
3.4.1 The Development of the OECD’s Double Taxation Convention
After World War II, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was formed
in 1947 to administer American and Canadian aid under the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction
of Europe.72 Engendering market reforms in the European Community73 was a focal point under
the mandate of the OEEC. As such, the OEEC was concerned about the problem of international
double taxation. To this end, the Fiscal Committee of the OEEC produced three reports containing
measures that would solve the problem of international double taxation.74 In 1961, the OEEC
became the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The latter was
tasked with a much wider mandate, adopting some of the work of the then-defunct League of
Nations, including the mandate to develop policies to enhance the economic development of
member states and the world at large.75 In 1963, the fiscal committee presented its final report to
the OECD. The report was commended to member states for adoption and implementation, and
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was mutually agreed to by the OECD member countries as the Draft Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation Convention.76
The draft Convention has undergone a series of revisions over the years, incorporating
amendments to the Convention as they are being made. The objective of these revisions is to
harmonize national fiscal laws to prevent international double taxation and fiscal evasion.77 In all
the revisions, the OECD followed the approach of the League and the US on the separate treatment
of associated entities of MNCs by adopting the arm’s length principle as the standard to be applied
for assessing their taxable profits.78 The following section examines what the arm’s length
principle under the OECD’s Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital look like.
3.4.2 Overview of the Arm’s Length Principle Under the OECD’s Double Taxation Convention
on Income and Capital, 2014
Article 9 of the OECD’s Convention provides that the arm’s length principle must be the norm for
allocation of taxable profits among associated entities:
Where conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or
financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of
the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in
the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.79
To emphasize the principle as the norm for allocating profits among associated entities, the OECD,
in 1977, produced a report on it. This report was revised in 1995 into specific guidelines on the
application of the arm’s length principle by tax administrators.80 The Guidelines have undergone
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many revisions over the years, the most recent being the 2017 amendments. The guidelines copy
the hierarchy of methods for applying the principle as set out in the US Corporate Income Tax
Regulations of 1968.81 This hierarchy is the preference for traditional transfer pricing methods,
which revolve around comparability between transfer prices fixed by MNC entities, and open
market prices.
The transfer pricing methods in the OECD’s Guidelines are broadly classified into two categories:
the traditional approaches, namely, the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method; the Resale
Price Method; and the Cost-Plus Method; and the transactional approaches, which are the
Transactional Net Margin Method and the Transactional Profit Split Method.82 The OECD notes
that the use of any of these methods should be premised on its appropriateness in light of the
circumstances of the transaction being assessed.83 But it also advises that the methods are only to
be utilized in a manner that approximates arm’s length pricing.84 It then endorsed the CUP as the
appropriate method for establishing the arm’s length price for physical goods.85 The CUP method
compares the price charged for property or services transferred in a controlled transaction to the
price charged for property or services transferred in a comparable uncontrolled transaction in
comparable circumstances.86 The OECD, however, recognizes the possibility of circumstances
where the arm’s length price for functions performed by related entities resulting in the physical
good, rather than the physical good as a whole may be ascertained. In these circumstances, the
OECD advises the use of either the resale or the cost-plus methods.87

81

Supra note 69.
Supra note 80 at 101-145.
83
Supra note 80 at 97 paragraph 2.2.
84
Supra note 80 at 98 paragraph 2.6.
85
Supra note 80 at 102 paragraph 2.18.
86
Supra note 80 at 101.
87
Supra note 80 at 107 at paragraph 2.32.
82

78

The resale method is a function-based method which uses the gross margin on functions performed
in related-party transactions to arrive at arm’s length prices for such transactions.88 This method is
applied to adjust the profits from goods purchased from related entities, considering the functions
performed by them.89 The resale price is reduced by the resale price margin. What is left after
subtracting the resale price margin can be regarded, after adjustment for other costs associated
with the purchase of the product, as an arm’s length price of the original transfer of property
between the associated enterprises.90
The second traditional alternative to the CUP method is the cost-plus method. This method aims
to ascertain what independent enterprises would agree to as cost of goods/services supplied to an
MNC entity by an affiliate. The OECD describes it as a transfer pricing method using the costs
incurred by the supplier of property (or services) in a controlled transaction.91 An appropriate
mark-up is added to this cost to make an appropriate profit in light of the functions performed
(taking into account assets used and risks assumed) and the market conditions. What is arrived at
after adding the mark-up may be regarded as an arm’s length price of the original controlled
transaction.92
Transactional transfer pricing methods differ from the traditional methods because they rely more
on the functions performed by MNC entities that result into the profits being assessed.93 The
OECD’s Guidelines contain two transactional methods: transactional net margin, and the
transactional profit split methods.94 The transactional net margin method examines the net profit

88

Supra note 80 at 105-6.
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
91
Supra note 80 at 111.
92
Ibid.
93
Supra note 80 at 117.
94
Ibid.
89

79

margin relative to an appropriate base (e.g. costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer realises from a
controlled transaction or from transactions that it is appropriate to aggregate under the principles
of comparability under chapter III of the Guidelines.95
The transactional profit method is a radical departure from the separate entity principle in that it
involves a profit split of the “combined profits”96 among related entities.97 The OECD advises that
the split be in alignment with the principles of comparability under paragraphs 3.9-3.12 of the
Guidelines.98 Where comparable uncontrolled transactions of sufficient reliability are unavailable,
the OECD proposes that tax authorities resort to internal data.99
The inclusion of the transactional methods evidences the significant weaknesses of the arm’s
length principle in the allocation of taxable income among associated entities. The proponents of
the separate entity principle, which metamorphosed into the arm’s length principle, would be
displeased to see the increasing modifications that have been incorporated into the principle, most
especially through the transactional profit method. Although the OECD gives a blanket suggestion
that all the methods be applied in alignment with the notion of “comparability”, that is, with what
independent enterprises would do under comparable circumstances100, the transactional profit
method allows tax authorities to dispense with the comparability test where there are no
comparable uncontrolled transactions of sufficient reliability, especially for transactions involving
intangibles.101

95

Supra note 80 at 117-8.
The OECD defined it as the profits to be split for the associated enterprises from the controlled transactions in
which the associated enterprises are engaged.
97
Supra note 80 at 133.
98
Ibid.
99
Supra note 80 at 143 at para 2.147.
100
Supra note 85.
101
Ibid. See also the OECD (2014), Practical Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, OECD/G20 BEPS
Project, OECD Publishing at 46-49.
96

80

3.5 The Arm’s Length Principle in the UN Model Double Taxation Convention between
Developed and Developing Countries
The UN joined the OECD in designing international taxation rules but with attention to the peculiar
interests of developing countries. In designing these rules, the UN’s aim was to strengthen the
inflow of foreign trade from developed to developing countries. To this end, it recognized the role
that rules governing the taxation of MNCs would play.102 The UN sought to influence the
provisions of double taxation treaties between developed and developing countries in order to
create attractive investment climates in developing countries as source countries.103 It published
its Model Double Taxation Convention in 1979, which it subsequently revised in 1999 and 2011.104
The UN retained the arm’s length principle in its Article 9, just as the OECD did.105 It subsequently
released its version of a transfer pricing manual for developing countries in 2013, as amended in
2017.106 The UN Guidelines contain transfer pricing methods that mirror the OECD’s but go a step
further to discuss how emerging economies, such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa, could
apply the arm’s length principle.107 These countries recount their experiences with the arm’s length
principle as they discuss some challenges they face in applying the principle, such as lack of
comparables, lack of information about the global businesses of MNCs and, broadly, lack of
sophisticated mechanisms for the effective application of the principle, unlike the developed
countries have. The OECD and UN Double Taxation Conventions provisions on transfer
mispricing create a composite framework of common elements. It is now considered how,
together, they give effect to the arm’s length principle.

102

Origin of the United Nations Model Convention Supra note 2 at vi-xiii.
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Supra note 5 at 15-6.
106
United Nations, Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, Department of Social Affairs,
united Nations, New York, 2017.
107
Ibid at 357-409.
103

81

3.6 The Arm’s Length Principle under the UN and OECD Regimes
The nagging consequences attached to transfer pricing as discussed in Chapter 2, and the
unavailing efforts by the OECD and the UN, as examined above, compels an assessment of the
arm’s length principle. This assessment considers the nature of the principle, and its application to
the transfer pricing methods that it generates.
3.6.1 The Nature of the Arm’s Length Principle
Scholars have critiqued the nature of the arm’s length principle as it applies to MNCs.108 The
common denominator in the concerns raised against the principle relate to the challenges involved
in applying it to MNCs, given the structure of MNCs and how they transact.109 Scholars note that
the integrated structure of MNCs is responsible for the challenges associated with the application
of the arm’s length principle as an effective means to deter BEPS. For instance, Picciotto, writing
on the problem of BEPS and the OECD’s BEPS Report, notes that the issues with the arm’s length
principle are intractable:
These problems result from a deep structural flaw in the international tax system. This flaw
is the failure to treat TNCs according to the economic reality that they operate as integrated
firms under central direction…Instead, a principle has become gradually entrenched that
they should be taxed as if they were separate enterprises in each country dealing
independently with each other…. This not merely allows but encourage TNCs to organize
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their affairs by forming entities in suitable jurisdictions to reduce their overall effective tax
rate, by a variety of means.110
As these scholars argue, the inadequacy of the arm’s length principle as a deterrent to BEPS comes
from not recognizing that even though an MNC consists of a parent company and several affiliates
located across multiple jurisdictions, they are linked, and as such, all entities, wherever they are
located, operate to achieve the same goal, which is to maximize global profits.111 Consequently,
in light of the obvious realities of trade between and among MNC entities, which leaves room for
transfer pricing manipulation, it is not a wise decision if the combined profits of MNCs are
apportioned to affiliates and PEs based on their separate accounts in line with the arm’s length
principle. Wilkie explains the practical factors that shape transactions within an MNC as follows:
“Neither in a transfer pricing context nor with reference to other notions of tax jurisdiction do
global “firms” conduct business as a collection of autonomous actors. They see themselves as
single economic enterprises, or “firms”, with equally singular or unitary profits…”.112
The arm’s length principle bears a striking resemblance to the doctrine of separate personality
under corporate law as established in Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd.113 This case established that
a company is a separate entity different from its owners, and imbued with the legal rights of
corporate personality, which include the right to sue and be sued; own and be able to transfer
property; and enter into contracts; and other rights incidental thereto. The framers of the arm’s
length principle basically imported this principle into international taxation to say that although
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MNC entities may be related, they are distinct from one another. The principle of corporate
personality, however, should not be imported into international taxation given the notion of
“common ownership” that influences cross-border trade among MNC entities. The synergistic
nature of the relationship between MNC entities cannot be separated from the fixing of transfer
prices and, consequently, the profits declared in the jurisdictions in which these entities operate.
These entities enjoy competitive advantages of internalization to reduce production and transaction
costs.114 Since tax is seen as a cost, they consider the fiscal regimes of states in fixing their transfer
prices. For these obvious reasons, the arm’s length principle, to the extent that it regards MNC
entities as separate entities, is inherently flawed.
As noted, the arm’s length principle is fundamental to the application of the transfer pricing
methods. The mechanics and implications of this exercise are examined next.
3.6.2 The Arm’s Length Principle and Transfer Pricing Methods
The transfer pricing methods identified above are designed to regulate the arbitrary transfer prices
fixed by MNCs. In principle, they are meant to serve as a check on the taxable profits of an MNC
entity in source countries through a requirement that the profits declared by such an entity conform
to profits that an independent enterprise would have declared under similar circumstances. This
principle requires tax administrations to answer the “what would independent enterprises do”
question.115 For MNCs, the expectation is that they would transact as independent corporate
entities and, to this end, prices fixed on intra-firm goods and services would reflect market prices.
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In the event that they do not, tax authorities may seek to adjust the profits, using recognised transfer
pricing methods to adjust prices to conform to arm’s length prices.116
The fundamental flaw with this principle inheres in the assumption that there are arm’s length
prices for goods and services internally supplied within MNCs. Different from the requirements
of this principle, the continuous use of transfer pricing by MNCs to engender BEPS and the
challenges that countries face while applying the arm’s length principle to adjust transfer prices
point to the fact that comparables rarely exist.117 No such independent enterprise is able to transact
the way MNCs do because, apart from the way MNCs leverage upon the benefits of internalization
to maximize profits, some profits are more “insidiously unavoidable because they inhere in
association”.118 As regards the flaws of the arm’s length principle through the application of the
transfer pricing methods, Wilkie explains as follows:
The expectation of transfer pricing is that through a variety of methodological simulations,
the relative equivalence…devoid of the taint of “association” can reliably be discerned.
However, a “firm” is an economic unity despite its operating manifestation as various legal
“bits”. It is the direct antithesis of the taxpayers to which the “arm’s length principle” is
meant to apply. Its internal organs and appendages have no more intrinsic significance than
the organs and limbs of the human body each on its own apart from the human “being” of
which it is a component. A “firm” is an economic “being”. Its existence, and the inherent
value it captures by its existence is uniquely self-interested; it is not merely the sum of the
values ascribed to its bits as if they had the same functionality and significance apart from
that economic being.119

The inadequacy of the arm’s length principle is seen through the perception that arm’s length prices
can be found for non-arm’s length relationships. The arm’s length principle might have been easy
to ascertain in the early years of trade when trade was restricted to physical goods. However, in a
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globalized age where business entities transact in intangibles with unique features and even
without necessarily being required to maintain physical presence, the search for comparables can
become endless.120
The deficiencies of the arm’s length principle are brought to light when tax authorities deal with
transfer prices fixed on intangibles. Given that intangibles create rights that are peculiar to the
MNCs that developed them, the subjection of transfer prices fixed for intangibles to “comparable
circumstances” does not make the valuation easier.121 This is because the arm’s length principle
leaves out the real factors that ought to be considered in allocating profits to affiliates and PEs,
that is, economic factors that resulted in the profits from intangibles. 122 Intangibles are important
because they add significant value to MNC business.123 Avi-Yonah points out that intangibles are
“central among the necessary conditions for the successful operation of MNEs”124 Consequently,
the inability to evaluate the transfer prices for intangibles with the aim to prevent transfer pricing
manipulation constitutes a huge gap in international taxation, and explains why BEPS remains a
challenge.
Recognizing the difficulties involved in valuing intangibles, the OECD released guidance on
valuing intangibles.125 This guidance forms one of the first sets of deliverables on Action Plans 8-
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10 of the OECD’s BEPS Action Plan.126 In this guidance, the OECD proposes that states pay
attention to the economic factors that shape the development and use of intangibles by performing
a functional analysis of the following factors: functions performed, use of assets, and assumption
of risks by MNC entities in the development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of
intangibles.127
This appears to be a step forward in transfer pricing of intangibles, but for the subjection of the
functional analysis to the comparability test under Article 9 of the OECD Convention.128 It is safe
to conclude that, notwithstanding the OECD’s inclusion of transactional transfer pricing methods,
the arm’s length principle remains the heart, spirit and the foundation of the international transfer
pricing regime.129 This is why all the transfer pricing methods and guidance on their applicability
echo the dominance of the comparability test, rejecting a complete functional analysis of the
economic activities of MNCs.
In a bid to apply the arm’s length principle more effectively, countries like Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay and Ecuador adopt a “sixth method” of valuing non-arm’s length transactions.130
Although these countries claim they are applying the arm’s length principle via this sixth method,
the method differs from the OECD’s transfer pricing methods and guidelines. The sixth method
allows tax authorities in the different countries where it is utilized to ignore the transfer pricing
arrangements made by related entities and to use the quoted price131 if it is greater than the transfer
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prices.132 The extent to which the arm’s length principle is being stretched is also seen in the
application of fixed margins (average of 20%) for gross profits and mark-up in Brazil for the Costplus and Resale Transfer Price Methods.133 These alternative methods create uncertainty and
enough room for arbitrary tax assessments across these jurisdictions.
The interpretation of the arm’s length principle is another area where its inadequacy comes to the
fore. For instance, section 247(2) of the Canada’s Income Tax Act,134 in providing the Canada
Revenue Agency (the CRA) with power to adjust non-arm’s length transactions to reflect arm’s
length prices, itemizes the requirements that the CRA should take into consideration. One of these
is that “the terms or conditions made or imposed, in respect of the transaction or series, between
any of the participants in the transaction or series differ from those that would have been made
between persons dealing at arm’s length”.135 This requirement was interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Her Majesty The Queen v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc.136 The Supreme Court said
that this clause, which was also in section 69(2) in the 1985 Income Tax Act, obligated the CRA
to have regard to the “economically relevant circumstances” of the transactions as advised by the
OECD transfer pricing guidelines. By a joint reading of Section 69(2) of the 1985 Income Tax
Act, now Section 247(2), and the advice by the OECD to consider “economically relevant
circumstances” while ascertaining transfer prices of related entities, the Supreme Court justified
the inflated price paid to Glaxo Group by Glaxo Canada for the purchase of a drug, ranitidine. The
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Court justified this price on the ground that a separate agreement (licence agreement) between
Glaxo World and Glaxo Canada explained the reason behind the inflated price. According to the
Court, Glaxo Canada did not just pay for the purchase of the product, but also compensated Glaxo
World for its secondary manufacturing and marketing functions as per the terms of the licence
agreement between Glaxo Canada and Glaxo World.137 The court held thus: “Considering the
License Agreement and the Supply Agreement together offers a realistic picture of the profits of
Glaxo Canada”.138
This case exemplifies the extent to which the arm’s length principle can be extended through the
interpretation given it to justify an apparent transfer pricing manipulation by which profit was
eroded from Canada by Glaxo Canada. It is apparent that the Supreme Court, in this case, went
beyond the scope of section 69(2), now 247(2), by digging into the internal transactions of Glaxo
Canada. One might wonder if the drafters of Section 69(2) could have contemplated this situation,
which shows the extent to which the principle can be stretched even to the point of justifying an
apparent case of abusive transfer pricing.
The continuous revisions of the transfer pricing guidelines illustrate the inadequacies of the
principle as a rule by which BEPS can be deterred. The OECD published its newest version of the
Transfer Pricing Guidelines on 10 July 2017.139 They provide more guidance on how the arm’s
length principle may be applied by source countries to promote transfer pricing outcomes that align
with value creation. The recommendations reflect the OECD’s work on Action plans 8-10,
Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, and Action Plan 13, Transfer Pricing
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Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting.140 The revisions focus on the need for tax
authorities, while applying the arm’s length principle, to understand the nature of MNC
transactions and apply appropriate transfer pricing methods.141
Also, novel mechanisms like Advance Pricing Agreements between taxpayers and tax authorities,
and Safe Harbour rules, have found their way into domestic tax laws to save both taxpayers and
states the time and resources that go into the assessment procedure under the arm’s length
principle.142 Advance Pricing Agreements are concluded between taxpayers and one or more tax
authorities, usually for about five years, regarding the taxpayer’s transfer prices. 143 Safe Harbour
rules relieve smaller taxpayers from complying with domestic transfer pricing rules. The OECD
says it is “a trade-off between strict compliance with the arm’s length principle and
administrability”.144 By the provisions of the safe harbour rules, taxpayers’ transfer prices would
attract little or no scrutiny.145 Notwithstanding these administrative mechanisms, the applicability
of the arm’s length principle remains a challenge. For instance, in India, there are backlogs of
transfer pricing disputes yet to be solved across jurisdictions and, more so, these disputes have
been said to involve complex transactions.146
Modification to the arm’s length principle in the face of its apparent flaws, especially its
inapplicability to the integrated nature of the activities of MNCs, further reveals the failed attempts
by the OECD and the UN to regulate MNC transfer pricing. In chapter 5, this thesis recommends

140

Ibid.
Ibid.
142
See Chapter IV of the OECD Guidelines supra note 80 at 204-224 on guidance on APAs and Safe harbour rules.
143
Marc M. Levey & Stephen C. Wrappe, Transfer Pricing Rules, Compliance and Controversy, 4th ed. (United States:
Wolters Kluwer, 2013) at 424 paragraph 1410.01.
144
Supra note 142 at 208 paragraph 4.112.
145
Ibid.
146
PWC, “India Publishes its First APA Annual Report” (2017): www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/pricingknowledge-network/assets/pwc-tp-india-apa-statistics.pdf (last accessed 13 July 2013)
141

90

the formulary apportionment (FA) approach to replace the arm’s length principle. The FA
approach obviates the need for comparables which, in most instances, are non-existent. The FA
approach divides the combined profits of an MNC and allocate these profits to states based on the
level of economic activity within their jurisdictions which generated the profits. In the next
section, I examine the OECD’s efforts to curb unhealthy fiscal policies of tax havens that engender
BEPS.
3.7 Conclusion
BEPS will continue, so long as states retain the arm’s length principle and tax havens continue to
exist. As shown, the arm’s length principle ignores the realities of trade between non-arm’s length
parties. The arm’s length principle, if anything, brings to the fore the inappropriateness of
comparing related-party transactions with that of independent enterprises in “comparable
circumstances”. Although there has been a shift from traditional to transactional methods, the
arm’s length principle still expects tax authorities to apply transactional transfer pricing methods
using the “comparability test”. As discussed above, the search for comparables can be an endless
one.
It cannot be denied that it is the sovereign right of states to design their tax systems howsoever
they choose. This is a major reason why, despite political commitments, states still engage in
harmful tax practices that encourage BEPS. An efficient structure for regulating the fiscal policies
of states must appreciate this factor; otherwise, it is bound to fail. I have discussed above that the
OECD’s reports on harmful tax competition leave out this factor among others. The other factors
which affect the prospect of success in the OECD’s “war” against harmful tax practices are the
ambiguity of the definition of tax havens and preferential tax regimes; the non-inclusion of nonOECD member countries in the process; the OECD’s lack of control over its own members that
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engage in harmful tax practices; the OECD’s allocation rules which engender BEPS in source
countries; and the inability of the arm’s length principle to prevent transfer pricing manipulation.
This thesis advocates, as an alternative to the arm’s length principle, the formulary apportionment
approach. This obviates the need for comparability, and it is based on a functional assessment of
the activities of MNC entities across the various jurisdictions in which they operate. An effective
functional analysis would require MNCs to publish their consolidated books of account reflecting
the functions performed by each member of the group, profits made and consequent taxable profits
accrued and paid in each country.
Considering the need for combined reporting by MNC entities as the starting point for the
alternative approach which this thesis proposes, the next chapter examines one of the revisions to
the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines: Country-by-Country Reporting Rules (the CBCR Rules)
contained in chapter V of the OECD Guidelines. The OECD proposed the CBCR Rules as
additions to the arm’s length principle. The next chapter discusses the gaps in the rules as tools to
fight against BEPS on a global scale.
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Chapter 4
The OECD and the Country-By-Country Reporting Mechanism: An Assessment
4.0 Introduction
This Chapter assesses the potency of the Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) Rules as an
addition to transfer pricing rules based on the arm’s length principle, designed to solve the problem
of lack of adequate information about the global activities of MNCs. This chapter assesses the
CBCR Rules and highlights some of their fundamental weaknesses that are likely to impede the
global fight against BEPS. These weaknesses are ingrained in three clauses in the OECD’s
Guidance on the implementation of the CBCR Rules, which define the operation and use of the
CBCR. As such, the Rules determine, largely, the success of a global fight against BEPS. The rest
of this Chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 reviews pertinent aspects of the OECD’s 2013
BEPS project that led to the enactment of the CBCR Rules. It discusses the OECD’s optimism as
to the viability of the CBCR Rules as a tool that can be used to assist in eliminating BEPS globally.
Section 4.2 discusses the evolution of the CBCR mechanism. It reviews the development of the
CBCR mechanism, which is birthed in the advocacy of tax activists for increased transparency in
corporate governance for the benefit of everyone affected by the global activities of MNCs.
Section 4.3 examines the text of the OECD’s CBCR Rules and highlights their key provisions,
namely, the threshold, confidentiality, and ‘appropriate use’ clauses. This Section highlights the
differences between the OECD’s CBCR Rules and the CBCR mechanism designed by tax
activists. Section 4.4 assesses the key clauses of the OECD’s CBCR Rules, and concludes against
the OECD’s optimism regarding the viability of the Rules as a tool by which BEPS can be
eliminated globally. This Chapter concludes in Section 4.5, reiterating that only an amendment of
the key clauses of the CBCR Rules can make for a viable mechanism by which BEPS can be
eliminated globally through their provisions.
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4.1 The OECD’s BEPS Project
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, in 2013, the G20 tasked the Committee of Fiscal Affairs (the
CFA) arm of the OECD to develop solutions to BEPS.1 Later in the year, the OECD through the
CFA produced 15 Action Plans tagged “BEPS Action Plans”, to be worked on and refined as
proposals to deter profit shifting.2 The OECD, through the BEPS Project, proposed a multilateral
approach to tackle profit shifting, and invited both developed and developing countries to provide
input into its design. According to the OECD, “[t]he global economy requires countries to
collaborate on tax matters in order to be able to protect their tax sovereignty”.3 This multilateral
approach was purportedly adopted by the G20 Leaders in Saint Petersburg, Russia, in September
2013. There they declared that: “Despite the challenges we all face domestically, we have agreed
that multilateralism is of even greater importance in the current climate, and remains our best asset
to resolve the global economy’s difficulties”.4
The objective of the OECD BEPS Action Plans is to enact rules that would promote taxation that
is aligned with value creation, which is poor due in large part to the transfer pricing policies of the
MNCs. The OECD highlighted the severity of the consequences of BEPS for governments,
individual taxpayers and businesses.5 It also noted the gaps in international taxation rules that
advance BEPS, and proposed a unified approach to tackle the problems associated with profit
shifting, such as bilateral treaty abuse, under-capitalization, and mispricing of property by MNCs
especially for intangibles.6 With respect to transfer pricing, the OECD noted that tax
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administrators’ lack of access to information about the global activities of MNC entities that
informed the taxable profits declared by them is a major cause of BEPS. The OECD describes this
challenge in the following words:
In many countries, tax administrations have little capability of developing a “big picture”
view of a taxpayer’s global value chain…In this respect, it is important that adequate
information about the relevant functions performed by other members of the MNE group
in respect of intra-group services and other transactions is made available to the tax
administration.7
The OECD highlights other factors that promote transfer mispricing by MNCs, such as the
challenges of the digital economy that make it difficult for tax administrations to effectively
evaluate transfer prices on intangibles, and in general, the synergistic nature of relationships that
exist between MNC entities that allow transfers of risks and capital, providing inappropriate
returns to them.8 Regarding transparency of the activities of MNC entities, the OECD notes that
transfer pricing documentation filed by MNCs with tax administrations fails to provide
comprehensive information about their activities.9 Although such information, as the OECD notes,
may become available while conducting an audit, they leave gaps for early detection of aggressive
tax planning techniques/strategies of MNCs.10 The OECD, therefore, recognizes the need to design
uniform rules that would require MNCs to provide information about their global activities at the
time of the transaction or, no later than the time of filing a tax return for the fiscal year in which
the transaction took place. The OECD listed this as action plan 13 in its Action Plans. It compels
the OECD to take action in order to:
Develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation to enhance transparency for tax
administration, taking into consideration the compliance costs for business. The rules to be
7
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developed will include a requirement that MNEs provide all relevant governments with
needed information on their global allocation of the income, economic activity and taxes
paid among countries according to a common template.11
Through this action plan, the OECD desires to balance the competing interests of states and MNCs,
that is, provision of adequate information about the global activities of MNCs to tax
administrations where they operate, and managing the cost of compliance for business. The need
for comprehensive information to be filed by MNCs, according to the OECD, is because of the
studies that show that there is an increased disconnection between value-creating activities of
MNCs and allocation of profits.12 Therefore, the OECD sees the expansive information to be filed
as a viable way for tax administrators to detect the tax planning activities of MNCs that engender
BEPS. It, therefore, seeks to address gaps in international taxation rules that allow the BEPSrelated activities of MNCs to be shielded from scrutiny by tax administrators. Currently, the
individual transfer pricing documentation filed by MNC entities with tax administrators of the
different countries where they operate covers only the entities’ activities in that jurisdiction.13 The
OECD says that this situation opens up windows of opportunity for MNCs to engage in BEPSrelated activities unknown to tax administrations.14 The OECD notes that the impact inheres in the
challenges faced by tax administrators in effectively assessing the appropriateness of the transfer
prices declared by MNC entities in the context of other functions performed by related entities.
The OECD summarized this as appropriate value-chain analyses.15 The OECD therefore maintains
that enhancing transparency for tax administrations, through the reform of its transfer pricing
guidelines to require the disclosure of information about the global activities of MNCs, will
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provide tax administrations with the information necessary to help them assess high-level transfer
pricing and other BEPS-related risks.
The OECD’s recent call for the reform of its guidelines on transfer pricing documentation was
borne out of the weaknesses of its initial guidelines that it adopted in 1995. Transfer pricing
documentation under the OECD’s former transfer pricing guidelines centred on the notion of
“reasonability”.16 This obligated MNCs to file documentation on their determined transfer prices
based only on “information reasonably available at the time of the determination of their transfer
prices and, overall, information sufficient to allow tax administrations to determine,
approximately, which taxpayers need further examination”.17 The Guidelines left out the specific
nature of the required documentation. They also left out the type of information sufficient for this
exercise. Prior to the reform of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines, the emphasis was on the
impact that detailed transfer pricing documentation might have on MNCs.18 According to the
OECD, “it would be unreasonable to require the taxpayer to submit documents with the tax return
specifically demonstrating the appropriateness of all transfer price determinations. The result could
impede international trade and foreign investment”.19
The inadequacies of the documentation required under the OECD’s former transfer pricing
guidelines led to national regulations with which MNCs were obligated to comply. Because
transfer prices are important aspects of MNC transactions, some states enacted detailed rules
requiring MNC entities to file information about all of their transfer pricing determinations. These
rules require disclosure about the particulars of the transactions being assessed, circumstances
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surrounding the transfer prices, and comparability analysis in consonance with the arm’s length
principle.20 Even with the detailed transfer pricing regulations introduced by states, the
restrictiveness of the transfer pricing documentation filed is of limited assistance to tax
administrations in recognizing the BEPS-related activities of the MNC more broadly. This is
because the documentation required to be filed covers only the transactions of the entities being
assessed. Closing this gap is the reason the OECD proposed an expansion to the documentation
filed by MNCs through the CBCR Rules to require MNCs to report to tax administrations in every
state in which they operate their global activities, including their transfer pricing strategies.
4.2 Evolution of the Country-by-Country-Reporting Rules
Before proceeding to discuss and assess the key provisions of the OECD’s CBCR Rules as a
mechanism designed for the elimination of BEPS, which is the focal point of the discussion in this
Chapter, it is important to set out, first, the evolution of the CBCR, to explain the rationale behind
its design and the objective that it was designed to achieve. The CBCR mechanism is the outcome
of the advocacy of tax activists for increased transparency in corporate governance through the
disclosure of comprehensive information about the global activities of MNCs.21 The first group to
fight for this cause was the Global Witness Group.22 Over the years, other non-governmental
organizations have joined the cause, including Global Financial Integrity, Christian Aid, Global
Witness, Tax Justice Network, Oxfam, ActionAid UK, Eurodad and Transparency International.23
CBCR was first suggested by Richard Murphy in 200324 as a new international accounting
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standard requiring MNCs to disclose information about their global activities.25 Murphy comments
on the nature of CBCR as a mechanism designed for the use of everyone affected by the activities
of MNCs thus:
…it is stressed that tax was by no means the only concern in suggesting what should be
disclosed: issues relating to governance, geopolitical and economic risk, corporate social
responsibility and exposure to potential corruption were all as significant when demanding
initial geographic data. The accounting data was also clearly designed to meet a variety of
other needs as well. Employment data, for example, also assists trade unions and those
interested in employment related issues whilst also permitting a range of productivity
related ratios to be calculated. Combining profit and capital ratios also indicates to
investors how effective management might be at allocating the capital entrusted to their
care. The significance of country-by-country reporting for these interest groups should not
be ignored.26
After Murphy designed the CBCR and encouraged states to adopt it as an accounting standard, a
good number of the non-governmental organizations identified above embraced it.27 The argument
for the inclusion of the CBCR mechanism by Murphy and tax activist groups shows that the CBCR
was not designed only solely for tax administrators. It is said to be beneficial to all stakeholders
involved. Stakeholders include “employees, suppliers, customers, governments, regulatory
agencies, civil society, trade unions, and ordinary citizens”.28 Murphy argues that MNCs owe these
people and agencies a duty of care because they provide MNCs with their “licence to operate”.29
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To this end, he says all stakeholders deserve to know about the transnational trade activities of
MNCs. He argues that although MNCs prepare consolidated accounts by which they indicate the
global trade activities of constituent entities, the information only reveals the business outlook and
investment trends of the MNC group as a whole for the benefit of shareholders. 30 As such,
information about intra-firm transactions, like the underlying profit shifting mechanisms utilized
by MNCs are not included in the consolidated financial accounts filed by MNCs.31 Given that
consolidated accounts are prepared for the benefits of shareholders, they, therefore, do not provide
an avenue by which other groups and agencies affected by the activities of MNCs can hold them
accountable for what they do.
Through their campaign for transparency, advocates for CBCR emphasize the importance of
transparency and accountability for MNCs in the jurisdictions where they operate, not just to tax
administrations but to members of the public. Murphy explains the objective of the CBCR as
follows:
The basic concept is to require the inclusion in annual audited financial statements of a
profit and loss account for each jurisdiction in which a multinational corporation had
operations during the year. These profit and loss accounts would include disclosure of both
third party and intra-group transactions, which for these purposes are those trades that take
place across national boundaries but between companies under common ownership or
control. They would be required to be reconciled with the overall group results.32
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The discussion and assessment of the OECD’s CBCR in this section is from this standpoint; that
is, to assess whether the provisions of the OECD’s CBCR Rules align with the original intention
for CBCR, and whether it provides a viable framework for a global fight against BEPS.33
4.3 The OECD’s CBCR Mechanism: Introduction
The OECD demonstrated its commitment to the cause of tax activists regarding increased
transparency for MNCs by including the CBCR mechanism in its first set of deliverables of the
BEPS Project in 2014.34 Later in September 2014, the OECD released the Country-by-Country
Implementation Package.35 The Implementation Package contains comprehensive information
about the CBCR Rules. The content of the CBCR documentation is summarized by the OECD as
follows:
The country-by-country report requires multinational enterprises (MNEs) to report
annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business the amount of revenue,
profit before income tax and income tax paid and accrued. It also requires MNEs to report
their total employment, capital, retained earnings and tangible assets in each tax
jurisdiction. Finally, it requires MNEs to identify each entity within the group doing
business in a particular tax jurisdiction and to provide an indication of the business
activities each entity engages in. 36
The OECD’s guidance on CBCR Rules demonstrates its desire to balance the competing interests
of tax administrators and MNCs. The Guidance contains rules allowing tax administrations to have
access to detailed information about the transfer prices of MNCs at an early stage, while allowing
for the performance of transfer pricing risk assessments to determine if the prices fixed on
transactions being assessed warrant in-depth review in the form of an audit.37 At the same time,
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the Guidance attempts to create a cost-effective mechanism for filing transfer pricing
documentation by MNCs, as it requires that MNC entities file the same set of documentation in
jurisdictions where they operate.38 The OECD introduced three new sets of documentation that
expand the filing obligations of MNCs namely: a master file, a local file and a Country-by-Country
Report.39
The master file is designed to provide information about the general overview of an MNC business
group, including the nature of its business, overall transfer pricing policies, and global allocation
of income and economic activity. The OECD says the import of the master file is to contain
information providing a “blueprint of the MNE group”. The local file, on the other hand, provides
information about the transaction being assessed in the context of the domestic country’s tax
system. According to the rules, such information includes relevant financial information about the
specific transaction, a comparability analysis and the selection and application of the most
appropriate transfer pricing method.
The CBCR that is the subject of this chapter of the thesis consolidates the information in both the
master and local files. It provides information relating to the tax implications of activities
conducted by all constituent entities of an MNC, locations of such activities, allocation of global
profits, and taxes paid. According to the OECD, CBCRs will be useful to tax administrations for
high-level transfer pricing risk assessment purposes, for BEPS related risks, and where
appropriate, for economic and statistical analysis.40 Information disclosure by MNCs is expected
to have a huge impact on transfer pricing risk assessments and audits by tax administrations.

38

Ibid.
Supra note 35 at 17-9.
40
Supra note 35 at 19.
39

102

The OECD is largely positive about the potential for states’ use of the CBCR to fight against BEPS.
It expressed its optimism thus:
This information should make it easier for tax administrations to identify whether
companies have engaged in transfer pricing and other practices that have the effect of
artificially shifting substantial amounts of income into tax-advantaged environments. 41
In February 2015, the OECD released further Guidance on CBCR (the Guidance),42 focusing more
on the Implementation of the CBCR Rules. The Guidance sets out in detail the types of MNCs
required to file CBCR, the suggested timing for filing CBCR, the mechanisms for exchange of
CBCR between countries, and the conditions that should govern the obtaining and use of CBCR
documentation.43
According to the Guidance, CBCRs are required to be filed only by MNC groups with consolidated
revenue of not less than €750 million or its equivalent in local currency as at January 2015, or
during the fiscal year immediately preceding the reporting fiscal year.44 Also, the obligation to file
CBCR is primarily on the ultimate parent entity of an MNC or, if unable to file, a surrogate entity
may be appointed by the MNC group to file.45 An ultimate parent entity is defined as one that owns
directly or indirectly a sufficient interest in one or more other constituent entities of the MNC
group, as a result of which it is required to prepare consolidated financial statements.46 A surrogate
parent entity is appointed by an MNC group not only when CBCR is not filed by the ultimate
parent entity, but also in situations where an ultimate parent entity files CBCR with its country of
residence but the country fails to share CBCR with other countries under the following
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circumstances: where the ultimate parent entity has no obligation to file CBCR under the laws of
its country of residence; or where the country of residence of the ultimate parent entity, though
party to the OECD’s International Agreement on CBCR, yet has no agreement with specific
countries regarding exchange of CBCR (the Qualifying Competent Authority Agreement
(QCAA)). A surrogate parent entity is appointed also if a systemic failure occurs, that is, where
the country of residence of an ultimate parent entity has a QCAA in place, but fails to exchange
CBCR with other signatories.47 For timing, the Guidance proposes that reporting must begin in the
fiscal year beginning on January 1, 2016. However, the recommendation of the September 2014
Guidance on CBCR was that MNCs be given one additional year to prepare for the filings. In view
of this, the OECD recommended the start date to be December 31, 2017.48
According to the OECD, the use of CBCR is limited to assessment of high-level transfer pricing
risks and other base erosion and profit shifting related risks, including the risk of non-compliance
by members of the MNC group with applicable transfer pricing rules. Where appropriate for
economic and statistical analysis, the CBCR may also be reviewed.49 The OECD specifically notes
that transfer pricing adjustments should not be based on CBCRs filed.50 Also, tax administrations
are under the duty to keep information derived from CBCR confidential. This is similar to their
obligations under tax information exchange agreements or other bilateral agreements for the
exchange of information and confidentiality obligations under domestic legislation. Thus, the
OECD proscribes exchange of CBCR with non-signatories to its mechanism for exchange, namely,
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the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement51, Double Tax Conventions and Tax Information
Exchange Agreements.52
Annexes III & IV to chapter V of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines consolidate all of the
OECD reports on CBCR.53 There, the OECD declares that the CBCR is to serve three key
purposes, namely: to ensure that MNCs give appropriate consideration to transfer pricing
requirements in establishing their transfer prices; and to provide tax administrations with adequate
information about the activities of MNCs to conduct an informed transfer pricing risk assessment;
to provide tax administrations with adequate information necessary to conduct an audit of the
transfer pricing activities of MNCs.54
Annex III contains a template for CBCR. This template provides information about the constituent
entities of an MNC for a fiscal year, namely: the tax jurisdictions that the entities operate from;
total profits derived from related and unrelated entities; profits/loss before tax; income tax paid;
income tax accrued; stated capital; accumulated earnings; number of employees; and tangible
assets other than cash and cash equivalents. An additional template provides information about the
tax jurisdiction of constituent entities of MNCs, and the nature of activities carried out by the
entities. Constituent entities are defined to include those included in an MNC group’s financial
statements, or entities excluded on size or materiality grounds, and permanent establishments.
With regard to permanent establishments, the OECD warns that the taxpayer should reflect their
operation (source) countries and not the country of residence of the business group. Also,
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information filed should indicate the countries of residence of entities, or jurisdiction of
incorporation where this is different.
Annex IV to Chapter V contains information about the implementation and exchange of CBCR.
Guidance in Annex IV mirrors the provisions in the OECD’s Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters55, which is the principal legislation on CBCR. It contains eight articles
covering definition of terms, provisions on filing obligations, provisions on the duty of an MNC
entity to give notification of the details of the reporting entity to its local tax administration,
summary of the content of CBCR, time for filing, terms governing use of CBCR and the obligation
on tax administration to keep the content of CBCR confidential, room for tax administrations to
insert penalty provisions in their local laws if they choose to and, lastly the effective date. The
detailed guidance on CBCR is to ensure that the OECD’s desire for consistency and uniformity in
the filing and use of CBCR is met.56 In the next section, this Chapter assesses the viability of the
OECD’s CBCR mechanism through the three key clauses, namely: the threshold, confidentiality,
and appropriate use clause.
4. 4 Viability of the OECD’ CBCR in the Global Fight against BEPS: A Weak Regime
Three clauses structure the OECD’s regime on the operation of the CBCR apparatus. In light of
the fight against BEPS, this mechanism is well intentioned but does not carry the bite for an
effective campaign against BEPS. An evaluation of the threshold clause, the confidentiality clause,
and the appropriate use clause reveals how unlikely it is that the OECD’s approach to CBCR Rules
will assist in the fight against BEPS. The CBCR Rules do not apply to MNCs with an annual
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consolidated revenue of less than €750 million by the provisions of the threshold clause. The
confidentiality clause prevents the opportunity to expose legal and institutional structures that
advance BEPS. The appropriate use clause forbids the use of information contained in CBCR filed
to adjust the tax liabilities of MNCs.
4.4.1 The Threshold Clause
The threshold clause is fundamental to an assessment of the viability of the Rules as a mechanism
designed to help fight against BEPS globally. This clause restricts the operation of the rules to
MNCs with an annual consolidated revenue of not less than €750 million in the year preceding the
time of filing the report. This restriction obviously weakens the OECD’s declared intent to
eliminate BEPS globally. Although there are statistics showing that MNCs engage in BEPS-related
activities, as discussed in Chapter 2, none show the types of MNCs that engage in these activities.
Therefore, without statistics demonstrating that only the MNCs that meet the prescribed threshold
engage in BEPS, the prescribed threshold lacks merit. What this does is to focus on the very large
MNCs, leaving out the smaller ones which also engage in BEPS-related activities. This situation
likely leaves a substantial amount of BEPS activity unexposed. It supports continued aggressive
tax planning by some MNCs. The number of MNCs left out of this laudable ideal of increased
transparency is a cause for worry in terms of how far the goal to eliminate BEPS globally can be
pursued. The MNCs which qualify for CBCR, as estimated by the OECD, represents 10-15 per
cent of the total number of MNCs.57
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This situation is worse for developing countries, which have fewer MNCs. Statistics reveal that
the headquarters of top MNCs are predominantly in developed countries.58 The parent companies
of majority of the 500 top MNCs that meet the OECD’s threshold, as listed by Fortune Global, are
based in developed countries, with China, Brazil, India, Russia, Mexico, India, Malaysia, Thailand,
Singapore, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the emerging economies, as the exceptions.59 The
implication is that other countries with smaller MNCs that are interested in eliminating BEPS may
be prevented from doing so if the MNCs that operate in their jurisdictions do not meet the OECD’s
threshold.
Surprisingly, the threshold also affects developed countries. For instance, according to statistics
on the number of MNCs with parent entities resident in Canada in 2006, as of December 16th,
2013, more than 1400 corporations would escape the web of CBCR just by the prescribed
threshold.
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If these corporations are exempt from filing CBCR in a developed country like

Canada, one might wonder what the figures would be in developing countries, and the least
developed countries that have even fewer MNCs.
By way of recommendation, it is suggested that states incorporating the OECD’s CBCR Rules into
their local laws should modify this clause to prescribe a more feasible threshold that would ensure
that CBCRs are filed by MNCs that are subject to their tax laws. Since there are no statistics
showing the category of MNCs that engage in BEPS, it is difficult to prescribe a threshold.
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Notwithstanding, there appears to be no justification for the exemption of some MNCs from the
CBCR obligation without evidence to back this up.
4.4.2 The Confidentiality Clause
This clause also demonstrates the inadequacy of the OECD’s CBCR Rules because it proscribes
the disclosure of information contained in the CBCR filed by MNCs to non-signatories and
members of the public. The concern this clause raises goes to the seriousness of the OECD’s
declared fight against BEPS. Compelling confidentiality excludes states that have not subscribed
to the OECD’s mechanism, as well as individual members of the public who are interested in
knowing about the earnings of MNCs within their jurisdictions and the amount of taxes they pay
on their profits. The implications of this clause on the global fight against BEPS are two-fold, as
discussed seriatim.
First, the confidentiality clause requires that signatories to the OECD’s Multilateral Competent
Authority Agreement on The Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports (CBC MCAA) can share
CBCR filed by entities of MNCs within their jurisdictions only with other countries that have other
MNC entities within their jurisdictions, provided the latter are, simultaneously, signatories to the
CBC MCAA. The problem with this clause flows from the fact that not all countries are signatories
to the OECD’s CBC MCAA. As at 22 June 2017, out of the 196 countries of the world, only 64,
that is, less than half, have subscribed to the OECD’s mechanism.61 This clause therefore denies
other countries useful information needed to help them to combat BEPS within their territories.
The confidentiality clause makes it impossible for countries which are interested in deterring BEPS
within their jurisdictions and, obviously, need the information contained in the CBCR but do not
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have the resources to commit to the OECD’s CBCR mechanism, to have access to CBCR filed by
MNCs. The majority of the signatories to the OECD’s exchange mechanism are developed
countries. In discussing the revenue consequences attached to BEPS in Chapter 2, it was
highlighted that BEPS affects developing countries more than it does developed countries.
Therefore, one would have thought that a mechanism designed to address BEPS on a global scale
would accommodate as many countries as possible. Clearly, the confidentiality clause fails to
create a framework necessary to eliminate BEPS globally.
Second, the confidentiality clause prevents the public from accessing CBCR filed by MNCs. It is
arguable that the fight against BEPS is incomplete without an opportunity for the public to assess
the information filed by MNCs, and to have the opportunity to consider how tax administrations
assess the tax liabilities of MNCs. These two conditions provide a ‘third-party opinion’ about how
MNCs carry on their businesses and how countries treat them, an exercise that is necessary to
evaluate the activities of MNCs and national responses to them. Public scrutiny helps to assess the
extent to which MNCs and tax administrators incorporate transparency and accountability into
their activities. Public disclosure of CBCR is not just for ‘public shaming’ of MNCs that engage
in BEPS. It is also to expose legal and institutional agencies in states that permit BEPS, whether
deliberately as acts of corruption, or unintentionally when laws require MNC entities to only
publish limited information and, as such, offers them a platform to hide their BEPS-related
activities.62 My normative claim is, however, subject to some privacy concerns examined below.
As the Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development put it, public disclosure
would enable “local stakeholders to know the real identity of the companies with which they are
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engaging”.63 This information is the starting point for making MNCs accountable for what they do
across jurisdictions. First, it offers a mechanism by which the public can compare the level of
profit recorded in these different jurisdictions with the amount of taxes paid on them. The public
can then query the amount of profits recorded in their jurisdictions if these are not commensurate
with the level of economic activities carried on within the jurisdictions. As discussed in Chapter
2, the detrimental consequences of BEPS affect individual taxpayers. Therefore, individual
taxpayers should also qualify as “stakeholders” to join in the fight against BEPS. They can,
however, only do so if provided with information contained in the CBCR as a premise to challenge
MNCs for their BEPS-related activities.
Another advantage of public disclosure of CBCR is making it possible to query the amount of
taxes collected by tax administrations on profits declared by MNCs, as well as the use of these
resources by governments. In this sense, CBCR would be a useful tool to challenge under-payment
of taxes by MNCs, as those reports would assist in assessing whether MNCs had not been paying
their appropriate share of taxes like other domestic taxpayers.64 Public disclosure of CBCR also
opens the door for public accountability because there would be publicly available information on
how much taxes government collects from MNCs, and how government uses these resources for
the public good. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 65 is geared to increase
transparency between governments and the public, but only in the extractive industry sector. The
possibility of public disclosure of CBCR stands out as a major reason why tax activists support the
CBCR. They rightly see BEPS as the combination of aggressive tax planning activities of MNCs
and inadequacies in the legal and institutional structures regulating how MNCs are taxed. If public
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disclosure of CBCR is allowed, it will give room for transparency to cut across sectors. It is this
encompassing framework that is needed to eliminate BEPS globally.
It is pertinent here to examine what the law requires in terms of protecting the privacy of
corporations. This is necessary to ascertain if the OECD’s CBCR Rules, in light of the
confidentiality clause, confers on MNCs a privilege that is non-existent in laws regulating the
transnational activities of corporations. The right to privacy is a fundamental right respected and
protected in nearly all nations by constitutional provisions, legislation, or common law rules. 66
This right, however, is usually interpreted only in relation to the protection it confers on individuals
rather than on corporate entities.67 The issue of the right to privacy of corporate taxpayers has not
attracted much academic and policy attention.68 Cockfield and McArthur explain this situation in
the following words: “...substantive privacy rights are generally associated with individuals. The
nature of these privacy rights devolves from the potential for intimate harm (for example,
kidnapping) that could result from the disclosure of an individual’s personal information. Such
concerns are less evident in the case of corporate taxpayers...”69
In cases relating to corporate entities where a right to privacy comes up for determination, the
Courts have emphasized that this right is guaranteed by constitutions to individuals only. For
instance, the Court of Appeal of Kentucky in Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort70 held: “…if the case at
bar turned upon the violation of a right of privacy, then the company’s cause would fail because
such a right is designed primarily to protect the feelings and sensibilities of human beings, rather
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than to safeguard property, business or other pecuniary interests.”71 More directly, the US Supreme
Court in California Bankers Association v. Shultz72 held that corporations do not enjoy the right
to privacy. The Court said:
While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of
public investigation, corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment
of the right to privacy. They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective
impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah argues that in the US, corporate privacy is an oxymoron. He says the right
to privacy applies only to individuals because only individuals have the kind of feelings that are
affected by invasions of privacy.73 In sum, therefore, the right to privacy should not apply to
corporations. As such, MNCs can be required by law to publicly disclose CBCR.
It is important to stress at this point that the argument for public disclosure of CBCR is for MNCs,
not tax administrators, and it is because public disclosure is necessary in the broad context of the
economic and social implications that BEPS creates for members of the public, as discussed in
Chapter 2. As MNCs owe a duty to tax administrators to report the activities that generate their
profits, they also owe members of the public a duty of care which is fulfilled when members of
the public are informed about their global activities.74 This duty does not depend on the duty of
confidentiality that tax administrations owe MNCs that is protected under domestic statutes. For
instance, section 241(1) of Canada’s Income Tax Act75 guarantees the right of non-disclosure of
taxpayer information to third parties. It provides thus:
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Except as authorized by this section, no official or other representative of a government
entity shall
(a) Knowingly provide, or knowingly allow to be provided, to any person any taxpayer
information;
(b) Knowingly allow any person to have access to any taxpayer information; or
(c) Knowingly use any taxpayer information otherwise than in the course of the
administration or enforcement of this Act, the Canada Pension Plan, the Unemployment
Insurance Act or the Employment Insurance Act or for the purpose for which it was
provided under this section.
The requirement for public disclosure of CBCR that this Chapter proposes does not conflict with
the duty of confidentiality which the law imposes on tax administrations discussed above. It must
be noted that there are existing initiatives promoting public disclosure of global activities. For
instance, Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US requires listed US corporations operating
in the extractive sector to publish payments made to the United States or a foreign government.76
Also, by virtue of the proposed amendment to the UK Finance Act 2016, MNCs operating in the
UK, domestic corporations, general and limited liability partnerships, LLPs with consolidated
revenue of €750 million or more, may be required by the Treasury to publish CBCR. 77 A similar
provision exists in the EU’s Directive for EU corporations.78 Specifically, financial institutions in
the European Union are obligated to publish CBCR by virtue of the provisions of Section 77 of
the European Union (Capital Requirements) Regulation.79 Section 77(1) provides thus:
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Subject to paragraph (2), each institution shall, from 1 January 2015, disclose annually,
specifying by Member State and by third country in which it has an establishment, the
following information on a consolidated basis for the financial year:
(a) name, nature of activities and geographical location;
(b) turnover;
(c) number of employees on a full time equivalent basis;
(d) profit or loss before tax;
(e) tax on profit or loss;
(f) public subsidies received.
These mechanisms, though laudable, are insufficient to combat BEPS on a global basis. The
reasons are, first, they apply to only extractive industries and financial institutions in the European
Union. Second, they exempt some categories of MNCs by the threshold fixed on the categories
of MNCs required to file CBCR. More importantly, these initiatives do not require disclosure on
every relevant aspect of MNC activities. For instance, none of the rules requires publication on
tangible assets of concerned MNCs.80 The Dodd-Frank Act enacted pursuant to the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is even worse because it does not require publication of
information about the activities of the filing corporations, nor the revenue made, profit/loss before
tax, and the number of employees.81 The OECD’s CBCR template has all the relevant information
necessary to evaluate the activities of MNCs. If the OECD’s confidentiality clause is expunged,
the OECD’s CBCR will serve as a more suitable platform by which the activities of MNCs in all
industries can be subject to a higher level of transparency through public disclosure.
The crux of the arguments raised against public disclosure of CBCR is that MNCs might lose some
competitive advantages if they disclose confidential information about their global activities, such
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as trade secrets.82 This is a serious concern that is recognized even by the OECD prior to the
adoption of the CBCR Rules. It is to cater to this concern that Article 26(3) of the OECD Model
Double Tax Convention83 provides for the right of a tax administration to refuse to share the
information of a taxpayer if it is satisfied that doing so would violate the taxpayer’s right to
maintain commercial and trade secrecy. Given that confidentiality is such a serious issue, rules
should be enacted in such a way that compliance with them do not harm MNCs in the way they
conduct their businesses. Even so, it is important to assess whether public disclosure of CBCR
might lead to loss of competitive advantages and/or profits by MNCs. Cockfield argues that
statistics on this issue are polarised.84 Some note that MNCs are not eager to publicly disclose
information about their activities because they want to avoid scrutiny from investors on their
allocation of global resources. Others argue that the lack of interest in public disclosure is because
MNCs might incur some proprietary costs as a result.85 Cockfield further points to empirical
research that reveals that MNCs withhold information on their global activities because they want
to hide the fact that they shift profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions from tax
administrations and members of the public.86 Amidst the inconsistent findings on whether public
disclosure of CBCR would harm businesses or not, Transparency International (EU) based on its
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2016 research found that rather than for CBCR to reduce MNCs’ competitiveness, 43 per cent of
EU CBCR reporters maintained or increased their competitiveness.87 It reports as follows:
In fact, the research shows that 43 per cent of the European companies that already publicly
report on a country-by-country basis improved or maintained their revenue performance.
Similarly, more than 90 per cent of the assessed Indian companies that report on subsidiaryby-subsidiary basis had a revenue growth comparable or higher than an average of other
international companies in a similar sector...companies can no longer say public countryby-country reporting puts them at a competitive disadvantage. The research does not back
them up…88
Given the fundamental nature of the BEPS problem, together with the detrimental consequences
that it continues to have in various countries, the absence of rules protecting MNCs from publicly
disclosing their global activities, in light of the empirical evidence disclosure maintains and even
enhances their competitiveness, the clear conclusion to draw is that the confidentiality clause of
the OECD’s CBCR Rules is not the right tactic to adopt. Does the ‘appropriate use clause’ provide
any better hope for the fight against BEPS?
4.4.3 Appropriate use
The restricted purposes for which the CBCR reports filed by MNCs can be used, as provided under
the CBCR Rules, is another major weakness of the Rules, and this will likely impede a global fight
against BEPS. This clause circumscribes the use of the CBCR Reports filed to transfer pricing
assessments and economic and statistical analysis. The OECD declares as follows:
The country-by-country report will be helpful for high-level transfer pricing risk
assessment purposes. It may also be used by tax administrations in evaluating other BEPS
related risks and where appropriate for economic and statistical analysis. However, the
information in the country-by-country report should not be used as a substitute for a
87
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detailed transfer pricing analysis of individual transactions and prices based on a fully
functional analysis and a full comparability analysis.89
The above quote confirms that the OECD designed the CBCR mechanism only as a source of
information to tax administrations for risk assessment. The problem with this arrangement is that
the rules do not improve the application of transfer pricing rules based on the arm’s length principle
in any significant way. The fundamental weakness of the arm’s length principle, as discussed in
Chapter 3 is the inability to apply it to efficiently tax MNC profits derived from the synergistic
relationships that exist between MNC entities. This creates a gap because tax administrations are
unable to ascertain the appropriateness of transfer prices declared by MNC entities. One would
have thought that an addition to the arm’s length principle, such as the CBCR Rules, would be
designed to improve the application of the principle with the aim to deter BEPS.
Given this implication, it is obvious that the restriction of the use of CBCR to assessment of highlevel transfer pricing and other BEPS-related risks is unhelpful to the application of the arm’s
length principle. This is because the Rules proscribe re-adjustment of MNC profits based on
information contained in the CBCR.90 This outcome undermines the fact that the relevance of the
CBCR as a tool to crack down on BEPS must lie in its practical usefulness as a source of
information that can be utilized to adjust the profits of MNCs if these are found to be inappropriate.
Knowledge about the BEPS-related activities of MNCs without the ability of tax administrators to
correct such activities impedes a global fight against BEPS.
The restricted use of the CBCR even goes against how states currently apply the arm’s length
principle. By the transfer pricing rules of states which reproduce the provisions of Articles 9(1)
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and 9(2) of the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions respectively, tax administrations are
empowered to adjust or even recharacterize the transfer prices of MNCs if these are found to be
non- arm’s length.91 To this end, the CBCR Rules do not support the tenets of the arm’s length
principle, and so they cannot be seen as an improvement on the principle’s effectiveness. Since
the OECD has declared its intention to retain the arm’s length principle, and only to amend it in a
way that it can be effectively used to combat BEPS92, one would expect any reform of the principle
to align with the objectives behind it. To the contrary, the “appropriate use” clause falls short of
advancing the objectives of the arm’s length principle.
4.5 Conclusion
Overall, the assessment of the threshold, confidentiality, and the ‘appropriate use’ clauses in this
Chapter reveals the inadequacies of the OECD’s objective to provide a framework, through the
CBCR, by which BEPS can be eliminated globally. To summarize the flaws discussed above, the
CBCR Rules exempt 85-90 per cent of MNCs from participating; it shields the information
contained in CBCR from non-signatories to the OECD’s mechanism for exchange of CBCR, and
from members of the public; and it forbids the use of CBCR for transfer pricing adjustments.
These fundamental flaws limit the viability of the OECD’s CBCR Rules as an addition to
international taxation rules for eliminating BEPS globally. More importantly, the fundamental
weakness of the arm’s length principle, as discussed in Chapter 3, is the reason this thesis
recommends an alternative approach - unitary taxation (formulary apportionment) - in place of the
arm’s length principle. The formulary apportionment (FA) approach, unlike the arm’s length
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principle, provides a better platform for the use of information contained in CBCR, and in this
way, would help in the global fight against BEPS. The unitary taxation approach ensures that the
profits of MNCs will be allocated to states based on the level of economic activities within their
jurisdictions from which those profits are generated. The indicia for allocation would be the key
indicators of the economic activities of MNCs provided in the CBCR filed, namely, assets, labour
and sales. The FA approach consolidates the global profits of an MNC enterprise, examines the
economic activities that occurs in various states, and appropriates taxable profits to states based
on the level of those activities that occur in each state.

120

Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.0 The Formulary Apportionment Approach: A Better Complement to the OECD’s
Country-By-Country Reporting Rules?

Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis explained that MNCs fix transfer prices strategically to maximize
their global profits. It was also established that tax havens attract mobile capital through their
aggressive fiscal policies. Chapter 3 discussed the inadequacies of transfer pricing rules based on
the arm’s length principle that is, otherwise, supposed to enable tax administrators to eliminate
BEPS activities, including their lack of access to information about the global activities of MNCs.
The crux of the argument in this Chapter is that effective taxation of MNCs can only begin when
states adopt the Formulary Apportionment (FA) approach to replace the arm’s length principle.
The OECD recognizes the inadequacies of the arm’s length principle in combatting BEPS, but has
decided to reform rather than abandon it. This Chapter argues for the abandonment of the arm’s
length principle. What is needed is a complete overhaul of international taxation rules governing
how MNCs are taxed. This is the approach that would eliminate the opportunities that MNCs
capitalize on to erode taxes from source countries, and neutralize the harmful tax competition
practices that tax havens and preferential tax regimes engage in. I draw from and agree with the
approach advocated by Sol Picciotto. Lamenting the efficacy of both the arm’s length principle
and its projected reform proposals, he asserts:
The issue now facing us is how to establish international tax rules on a sounder basis.
Applying further patches to existing rules seems futile. What is clearly needed is to reorient
the rules so as to treat TNCs as single firms, instead of being based on the unrealistic fiction
that they are a loose collection of separate and independent entities in each country.1
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The inadequacies of the arm’s length principle as discussed in Chapter 3 inform Picciotto’s
assertion in the quote above. In this regard, this thesis endorses the switch to the formulary
apportionment (FA) approach in place of the arm’s length principle. The FA approach will ensure
that MNCs are taxed in jurisdictions where they operate, by ensuring that profits are allocated to
states on the basis of the level of economic activities, measured by objective factors, carried on in
each state.
One of the reforms proposed to current international taxation rules by the OECD is the mechanism
introduced pursuant to the Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) Rules. Although the objective
of the CBCR regime is to provide information to tax administrations about the global activities of
MNCs, the gaps identified in its structure, as fully discussed in Chapter 4, stand to impede the
global fight against BEPS. Chapter 4 suggested amending the Rules to recast CBCR, to make it a
viable mechanism in the effort to eliminate BEPS globally. The argument of this Chapter buttresses
this argument by adding that once the amendments suggested in Chapter 4 are incorporated, the
adoption of the FA would help to make the composite regime a more potent tool for eliminating,
or at least, minimizing the incidence and adverse impacts of BEPS. The rest of this Chapter is
structured as follows: Section 5.1 discusses the emergence of the FA approach and its operational
form. Section 5.2 explains the workings of the FA approach and Section 5.3 shows how the CBCR
can work in combination with the FA approach to eliminate BEPS globally. The Concluding
Section 5.4 sums up the discussion, emphasizing that a switch to the FA approach in the place of
the arm’s length principle, in combination with the CBCR when amended according to the
suggestions in Chapter 4, holds the potential for eliminating BEPS globally.

122

5.1 The Formulary Apportionment Approach: Background and Nature
The FA approach is not an entirely new concept. As far back as 1933, the Subcommittee of the
Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations, while weighing alternatives to the arm’s length
principle, considered the fractional apportionment approach, an approach like the FA approach.
Fractional apportionment, like FA, begins with the total net income of an MNC regardless of the
sources from which they come, divided in a prescribed ratio and allocated to states based on the
level of economic activities that took place within their jurisdictions.2 The Subcommittee found
that states resorted to the fractional apportionment approach when the income of non-resident
entities of MNCs could not be ascertained through the particular accounts filed.3 International
consensus at that time centred on the separate treatment of MNC entities. However, there was
evidence of the use of the fractional apportionment approach by states. Despite this, the League
failed to design rules to regulate its use. This rejection did not, however, bring an end to the use of
the approach by individual states in taxing MNCs.
For instance, the US modified its transfer pricing regulations in 1994 by including two
transactional transfer pricing methods to assess the economic functions performed by MNC
entities that resulted in the profits being assessed.4 The two methods the US utilized were the
comparable profit method (CPM) and the profit split method. The CPM is defined as “as a type of
formula designed to ensure that the profits of the related party do not fall outside a reasonable
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range of profit margins earned by other corporations which are not truly comparable with the
related party”.5 The profit split method is even closer to the FA approach than the CPM. It is the
“…end of the transfer pricing continuum, because it starts with the enterprise as a whole and
allocates the profits in a formulary fashion”.6 By this move, the US departed from the
internationally recognised straight-jacket means of taxing MNCs through the arm’s length
principle.7
The US initiative was borne out of the recognition and admission that the arm’s length principle
was inadequate as a mechanism by which to effectively tax MNC profits, given the synergistic
nature of the relationships that exist between MNC entities and the inability to verify the accuracy
of the transfer prices they declare. Notwithstanding the inclusion of elements of the FA approach
by the US through these two new methods, the US still titled the two methods the ‘basic arm’s
length return method’ (BALRM). Avi-Yonah wonders:
It is difficult to see in what way the BALRM can meaningfully be called an ALS method
in the traditional sense. First, since BALRM by definition can only be applied in the
absence of comparables, it falls outside the traditional definition of the ALS, which relies
on comparables. Thus, BALRM can only be called an "arm's length method" if the
definition of what constitutes "arm's length methods" is expanded to include any method
that reaches results that are the same as those that would have been reached by unrelated
parties. If this is the definition, then “arm’s length” includes the entire transfer pricing
continuum, including formulary apportionment, because even pure formulary
apportionment may, in appropriate cases, reach the same results as would have been
reached by unrelated parties dealing at arm’s length.8
Avi-Yonah’s comments about the difference between the BALRM and other transfer pricing
methods under the US transfer pricing regulations are insightful. However, his argument that the
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CPM and profit split methods can only be termed an arm’s length method if it is admitted that an
arm’s length method includes the FA approach is flawed. This is because the FA approach is a
stand-alone approach, and differs from arm’s length methods. For instance, while the arm’s length
methods including the BALRM under the US transfer pricing regulations require a comparative
analysis, the FA approach does not. The conclusion that can be drawn from the introduction of the
BALRM is that the US recognizes the inadequacies of the comparative analysis under the arm’s
length methods. It also appreciates the strength of functional analysis of MNC transactions under
the BALRM, by allowing the US Treasury to depart from a comparability analysis under the arm’s
length principle, and to analyse functions performed by MNC entities and their subsequent
allocation of profits to states by a formula.9 It, however, failed to embrace the FA approach in its
entirety by restricting the use of the CPM and the profit split methods to instances when
comparables cannot be found.
The OECD followed the US initiative by incorporating the CPM and profit split methods into its
transfer pricing guidelines.10 As well, like the US, the OECD failed to admit its departure from the
international consensus on the arm’s length principle and to admit they have adopted elements of
the FA approach. The OECD tried to block all avenues that may show partial abandonment of the
arm’s length principle. It did this, first, by, renaming the CPM as the transactional net margin
method. Second, it reiterated that the arm’s length principle was still the general principle that
states should adopt.11 The substance of the methods, especially the profit split method, however,

9

By virtue of the 1994 amendments to Section 482 of the US Internal Revenue Code.
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Publishing, Paris.
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Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, 2017 at 38.
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displaces any formal declaration by both the US and the OECD against the adoption of the FA
approach. This Chapter argues that the FA approach sits comfortably in the OECD’s profit split
method, though in a restricted form, and this can be expanded.
The profit split method as described in the OECD transfer pricing guidelines divides the combined
profits of MNC entities and allocates them to states based on a formula. The OECD provides two
means by which tax administrators can use this method. First is the contribution analysis, that is,
allocation of profits to states based on the level of economic activities performed by MNC entities
in these states. The second approach suggested is the residual analysis approach. The residual
approach is a two-sided transfer pricing approach. First is the assessment of the taxable profits of
MNC entities based on the traditional transfer pricing approach, that is, comparability, in order to
arrive at what the guidelines term the ‘routine’ profits of an entity. The second stage involves the
use of an allocation formula to divide the residual profits to entities based on their level of
contribution to the activities that produced the profits. The OECD prescribed the profit split
approach for the division of profits accruing from unique intangibles. According to the OECD,
this method is reserved for instances when comparables cannot be found, and allows tax
administrators to divide the combined profits of MNCs among constituent entities based on the
division of functions performed by individual entities. Functions to be measured are assets used
and risks assumed by the different entities.12
Additional evidence that the FA approach is not entirely new is that some federal states, namely,
the United States and Canada, use it to allocate profits to states/provinces.13 In the US, some states
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have adopted the FA approach to allocate corporate profits based on a formula founded on the
provisions of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act 14, and subject to the Federal
Commerce Clause and the supremacy clause.15 These clauses prevent taxation that discriminates
between interstate commerce which, otherwise, creates a risk of double or multiple taxation for
foreign commerce. In Canada also, corporate profits are allocated to provinces based on the
provisions of Part IV of the Regulations to the Income Tax Act 16, which allows the allocation of
the taxable income of a corporation to provinces in alignment with its level of economic activities
in those provinces.
The FA approach proposed here would expand how these states apply the FA approach nationally
to include the division of the worldwide profits of MNCs. To this end, the implications of the FA
approach, what it entails, and how it would work when adopted by tax administrations globally,
are discussed next.
5.2 The Workings of the FA Approach
The FA approach proposed here as an alternative to the arm’s length principle is a one-sided
approach, in the sense that it requires only a functional analysis of the global activities of MNCs.
It is different from the arm’s length principle which requires both a functional and a comparative
analysis. The FA approach involves the allocation of the combined/unitary profits of MNCs to
their constituent entities using an allocation key/formula. The combined profits to be split are the
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profits from each business activity of a MNC group.17 An activity is “a group of functions related
to the conduct of a particular trade or business to which two or more related parties contribute,
determined at the largest level of aggregation of functions performed that will permit reliable
identification of such related parties' respective contributions to the functions comprising an
activity”.18 In arriving at the combined taxable profits of an MNC group before it is allocated, the
FA approach requires the deduction of allowable expenses by a common accounting standard.19
The final stage involved in applying the FA is the division of the net income and its allocation to
entities based on the allocation formula.
It is suggested that the weighted average of three economic activities- physical assets, labour, and
sales- be used. This formula is similar to the one used in EU’s Common Consolidated Corporate
Base proposal.20 The choice of these three factors is to enable the capture of essential economic
activities in the various jurisdictions where they take place without discrimination. The limitation
to physical assets is deliberate, as intangibles are hard to value.21 Picciotto suggests that labour
should be based on a 50:50 weighting of payroll and headcount because of global wage
differences.22 He also suggests that sales should be based on the location of the consumers for
physical products and for intangibles, to be ascertained through the billing address of the
consumer.23 Based on these formulae, tax jurisdictions would receive a fair portion of global MNC
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profits via an appropriate fraction of the whole, based on the level of real economic activities that
occurred in each contributing jurisdiction.
On the choice of these three factors, Murphy notes:
“There is good reason for choosing these three “allocation keys” for determining whether
or not the economic substance of the transactions undertaken coincides with the place and
form in which they are reported for taxation purposes: companies cannot make profits
without sales and they cannot make sales without employing people and physical assets,
many of which will be linked to the production process”.24
Emphasis is placed on the equal weighting of the three factors because concentration on one or
two factors would jettison the contributions of some states to the worldwide profits of MNCs, a
situation that would eventually bring about BEPS in the countries left out.
The experience in the US, where some states resort to a formula that has higher or exclusive weight
on sales, shows the need to give equal consideration to each of the factors involved in the FA
approach.25 Commenting on the heavy concentration on the sales factor in the US, Clausing notes
that it introduced unhealthy tax competition there, and engendered what she termed ‘beggar-myneighbour policy choices’. In other words, harmful tax competition is likely to result where distinct
formulas are chosen.26 Therefore, to prevent a re-introduction of BEPS, this work argues for equal
weighting of the three factors identified above to determine and allocate MNC global profits.
The FA approach proposed here is different from the profit split method endorsed in the OECD’s
transfer pricing guidelines. The profit split method is a two-sided transfer pricing approach that,
first, requires a comparability analysis for routine profits before the apportionment of residual

24

Richard Murphy, Country-by-Country Reporting in Thomas Pogge & Krishen Metha (ed.) Global Tax Fairness
(United States: Oxford Press, 2016) at 106.
25
Kimberly Clausing supra note 13 at 25.
26
Ibid.

129

profits to relevant tax jurisdictions using a formula.27 The inadequacies of the ‘comparability’ test
have been admitted by the OECD itself. In sum, since the integrated functions performed by MNC
entities make it difficult to determine arm’s length prices for the activities that they engage in,
there is no reason why the arm’s length principle should be retained. Discussing the value in
abandoning the arm’s length principle for a functional assessment of the economic activities
engaged in by MNC entities, the OECD says:
The profit split method offers flexibility by taking into account specific, possibly, unique
facts and circumstances of the associated enterprises that are not present in independent
enterprises while still constituting an arm’s length approach to the extent that it reflects
what independent enterprises would have done if faced with the same circumstances…it is
less likely that either party to the controlled transaction will be left with an extreme and
improbable profit result, since both parties to the transaction are evaluated.28
Integrated entities like MNCs can only be effectively taxed through a mechanism that recognizes
and admits the peculiar contributions of their constituent entities and the impossibility of
effectively taxing them through a subjection of the transfer prices they declare to a comparability
test. Resort to profit split as a fall-back method would give room for BEPS because the arm’s
length principle, as discussed in Chapter 3, is ineffective in allocating profits from the synergistic
relationships that exist among MNC entities. The OECD understands this fundamental fact, but
still formally rejects the FA approach as a stand-alone method.
My contention is that there seems to be no justification for the retention of the arm’s length
principle and regarding the profit-split method as a fall-back option, especially considering the
inadequacies of the principle. In this sense, the arguments for reinvigoration of transfer pricing
rules is displaced. On this point, Lorraine Eden argues that the phenomenon of BEPS is not a
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transfer pricing problem but an international tax regime design problem that is best handled by
fixing the source and residence rules in the international tax regime.29 To this end, she recommends
that residence countries should tax the worldwide profits of resident MNCs (including
unrepatriated profits), while extending credits for foreign taxes paid. Alternatively, a regime with
stronger anti-abuse (e.g., CFC rules) should be considered to end the BEPS problem.30
Contrary to Eden’s arguments, it should be reiterated that the problem of BEPS begins with transfer
mispricing/transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs. Although the tax rules of states may encourage
profit shifting, the fundamental cause of BEPS is transfer mispricing/manipulation by MNCs.
Therefore, the solution to BEPS should first address the opportunities that the arm’s length
principle affords MNCs to manipulate transfer prices. BEPS can only be eliminated when states
replace the rules governing the formal attribution of profits to source and residence countries and
focus on the level of economic activities carried on by MNC entities in various jurisdictions. The
FA approach is perfect to achieve this objective. In support, Picciotto declares “…this approach
does not seek to attribute profit, since it assumes that the profits of an integrated firm result from
its overall synergies and economies of scale and scope. It allocates profits according to the
measurable physical presence of the firm in each country”.31
My proposed FA approach would not completely resolve the problem of BEPS. For instance,
Dharmapala cites instances where the FA approach may give rise to other efficiency costs, such as
the introduction of ‘reselling strategies’ where firms sell goods to arm’s length parties in low-tax
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jurisdictions, and in turn, they resell them in high-tax jurisdictions.32 It is not clear what states can
do to control this. It is also conceded that the FA approach may not be the perfect means to
eliminate BEPS globally. But as Picciotto notes, “…aligning tax rules more closely to the
economic reality of integrated firms operating in liberalized world markets would make taxation
of MNCs simpler and more effective”.33 In this context, how would the CBCR required to be filed
by MNCs assist states to fight against BEPS globally? This issue is considered next.
5.3 The Value of CBCR under the Formulary Apportionment Approach
The analysis of Chapter 4 exposed the gaping holes in the OECD’s CBCR Rules, the ultimate point
of which is that the Rules cannot, as they are, help a global fight against BEPS. Consequently, it
was recommended that there must be amendments to the threshold, confidentiality and the
appropriate use clauses that frame the legal character and operational efficacy of the CBCR. It was
stressed that without the changes, the OECD’s declared intention to end BEPS globally would not
be assisted by the implementation of the CBCR Rules. In sum, MNCs that do not meet the annual
consolidated threshold revenue of €750 million or more are not required to file CBCR. Nor can
this information be shared with non-signatories to the mechanism or the public. As well, CBCR
information, where this is filed, cannot be used to adjust the profits of MNCs that filed them. As
argued in Chapter 4, only the removal of these restrictions would allow the CBCR to become an
asset in the effort to eliminate BEPS.
The argument here is that the OECD’s proposed CBCR holds the potential to be such a weapon
against BEPS under the FA approach. The CBCR required to be filed by MNCs would reveal the
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global activities of MNCs, such as research and development, the holding or managing of
intellectual property, and purchasing or procurement.34 This provides an opportunity to introduce
rules that promote transparency and accountability on the part of MNCs. In practice, this serves to
ensure that the activities of MNCs in various jurisdictions, and globally, are available to tax
administrators, making it easy to effectively assess and tax them under the FA approach. This
possibility exists because all the relevant factors needed for the application of the FA approach are
captured in the CBCR. All that would be left is the allocation of profits using the prescribed
formula based on the economic activities disclosed.35 Otherwise, tax administrators would be
unable to maximize the use of the information disclosed in CBCR by the arm’s length principle.
For instance, if the information in the CBCR shows that profits were shifted to tax havens where
little or no economic activities that generated the profits being assessed occurred, tax
administrators cannot adjust the transfer prices without having the comparables that the arm’s
length principle demands. But under the FA approach, all that tax administrators have to do is
adjust the transfer prices fixed and re-allocate profits to states based on the level of economic
activities that took place in their jurisdictions.
It is admitted that the FA approach would introduce a paradigm shift into the taxation of MNCs,
because it goes against the separate treatment of MNC entities, a fundamental principle that shaped
the design of international taxation rules as far back as 1928. 36 Even so, the severe consequences
attached to BEPS, in the face of the weaknesses of the arm’s length principle, makes this change
more than worthwhile. Global adoption of the FA approach would upend the formal structures put
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in place by MNCs to conveniently engage in BEPS, and holds the potential to allocate the profits
of an integrated firm according to the measurable presence of the firm in each country. 37 The
challenge that remains, therefore, is to persuade the international tax community to dispense with
the current international taxation rules that allow states to tax only MNC entities present within
their jurisdictions in the face of the challenges in enforcing the arm's-length principle.38
5.4 Conclusion
The theme of this thesis is that the OECD’s Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) Rules as part
of the OECD’s BEPS project are insufficient to eliminate BEPS globally. The discussion
highlighted that BEPS is the unsavoury fruit of two fundamental factors, namely, transfer
mispricing/manipulation and harmful tax competition. It was pointed out that this phenomenon
undermines the fiscal rights of states, the notion of tax justice between states, and justice between
taxpayers within each state. In sum, the discussion established that BEPS severely undermines
national economies of tax revenue and development opportunity, and deepens the chasm and
mistrust between developed and developing states in terms of global economic equity.
It was explained that the OECD and the UN have sought to curb BEPS prior to the OECD’s
proposal for the adoption of the CBCR Rules. They did this via transfer pricing guidelines based
on the arm’s length principle and the OECD’s reports on harmful tax competition. It was shown
that by their increasingly sophisticated means of doing business, MNCs got around the arm’s
length principle under which their transfer pricing was regulated. The flaws of the principle are
evident in MNCs’ continuous use of transfer pricing to engender BEPS, though both the OECD
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and the UN sought to improve the effectiveness of the arm’s length principle by the introduction
of alternative transfer pricing methods. The chief failure of the arm’s length principle is the
subjection of MNC profits to a comparability analysis of ‘what similar enterprises would do in
comparable circumstances’. Similarly, the objective of the OECD to eliminate the unhealthy tax
policies of tax havens through the prescriptions of its Harmful Tax Competition Report of 1998,
together with subsequent reports issued by the OECD pursuant to the 1998 Report, has not been
achieved. The clearest evidence for this is the continuing existence of tax havens and preferential
tax regimes. Among other observations, it was stressed that the OECD’s effort had little chance of
success because, as an institution, it cannot compel sovereigns to observe its fiscal rules. This is
even more so when some OECD members are themselves tax havens tax havens and preferential
tax regimes.
The OECD’s effort, at this point, to push for a more globally acceptable and effective solution to
BEPS comes in the CBCR Rules. The discussion established that the nature and operational
implications of its three-legged framework or structure, namely, the threshold, confidentiality and
the appropriate use clauses, cumulatively, ensure that: MNCs with annual consolidated revenue of
less than €750 million are exempt from filing CBCR; non-signatory states and the public would
have no access to the information filed by the MNCs that report under the Rules; and information
contained in the CBCR filed by MNCs cannot be used to adjust their income for tax purposes. The
conclusion reached is that, these features of the CBCR Rules disable the regime it spawns from
being an effective asset in any global effort to minimize or eliminate BEPS.
Given this hapless outcome, this thesis argues for the adoption, promotion and implementation of
the FA approach to international taxation in order to curb BEPS through the elimination of tax
135

havens and preferential tax regimes. This approach aggregates the global income of MNCs as
collated by the contributory profits of their constituent entities. The tax imposed on this aggregate
income is distributed equitably to each jurisdiction in which an activity took place in light of the
extent of the contribution of that activity to the MNC’s global income. It is urged that this can be
done unless the global community is unwilling to do it.
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